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I. Introduction 
“It’s a bad week to have been conducting an extra-marital 
affair.”1 The Ashley Madison data breach on August 18, 2015, 
achieved nationwide notoriety2 and is just one of many examples 
of large-scale data breach that have occurred within the last few 
years.3 AshleyMadison.com is an adult dating website that 
matches married men and women looking for “casual encounters, 
married dating, discreet encounters, and extramarital dating”; its 
slogan is, “Life is short. Have an affair.”4 A group of hackers 
                                                                                                     
 1.  See Zahra Mulroy, Ashley Madison Hack: Cheaters and Victims’ 
Reactions Are NOT What You Expect, MIRROR (July 22, 2015), 
http://www.mirror.co.uk/lifestyle/sex-relationships/ashley-madison-hack-
cheaters-victims-6112966 (last visited May 12, 2016) (predicting the likely 
repercussions of the Ashley Madison data breach and subsequent dissemination 
of customer information) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 2.  See Adrienne LaFrance, What Everybody Googled in 2015, ATLANTIC 
(Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/12/what-
everybody-googled-in-2015/420717/ (last visited May 12, 2016) (reporting “What 
is Ashley Madison” as a top 10 Google search in 2015) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 3.  See Grave Gavilanes, Hackers Access Ashley Madison Site, Data Expose 
Online Cheaters, PEOPLE (July 20, 2015, 4:00 PM), 
http://www.people.com/article/ashley-madison-site-hack (last visited May 12, 
2016) (discussing the release of a statement by Avid Life Media, Inc.—owner of 
AshleyMadison.com—confirming unauthorized access by hackers to confidential 
customer information) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For 
just a few instances of data breaches occurring in October 2015 alone, see Eric 
Chabrow, Scottrade Belatedly Learns of Breach, DATA BREACH TODAY (Oct. 2, 
2015), http://www.databreachtoday.com/scottrade-belatedly-learns-breach-a-
8565 (last visited May 12, 2016) (noting that law enforcement notified 
Scottrade—a discount brokerage—of a cyber attack in late September 2015) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Mathew J. Schwartz, Experian 
Faces Congressional Scrutiny over Breach, DATA BREACH TODAY (Oct. 9, 2015), 
http://www.databreachtoday.com/experian-breach-congress-investigates-a-8580 
(last visited May 12, 2016) (discussing a recent data breach of Experian—an 
online securities trading company) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Karl Thomas, Dow Jones & Company Experiences Data Breach, 
WELIVESECURITY (Oct. 12, 2015, 2:31 PM), 
http://www.welivesecurity.com/2015/10/12/dow-jones-company-experiences-data-
breach/ (last visited May 12, 2016) (examining the October 12, 2015 data breach 
of Dow Jones) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 4.  ASHLEY MADISON, https://www.ashleymadison.com (last visited May 12, 
2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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known as “Impact Team” stole the confidential records and 
information of over 37 million Ashley Madison users.5 After a 
series of threats demanding that Avid Life Media, Inc.—
AshleyMadison.com’s owner—shut down the website, Impact 
Team publicly released the records.6  
Data breaches are a part of life in the modern technological 
world.7 Compilation of customer data is the norm for large 
corporations and small businesses alike.8 As a result, online 
hackers have developed sophisticated hacking methods capable of 
circumventing complex security systems and acquiring the 
sensitive customer information on their data servers.9 Once 
stolen, this data—known as personally identifiable information 
(PII)—greatly increases the victim’s likelihood of identity theft.10 
PII can be any information from customer phone numbers and 
home addresses to credit card information, medical information, 
and social security numbers.11 Identity thieves use this highly 
                                                                                                     
 5.  See Kim Zetter, Hackers Finally Post Stolen Ashley Madison Data, 
WIRED (Aug. 18, 2015, 5:55 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/08/happened-
hackers-posted-stolen-ashley-madison-data/ (last visited May 12, 2016) 
(detailing the public release of the hacked user information) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 6.  See id. (“The hackers deflected responsibility for any damages or 
repercussions that victims of the breach and data dump may suffer. ‘Find 
yourself in here? It was ALM that failed you and lied to you. Prosecute them 
and claim damages . . . .’”). 
 7.  See infra note 14 and accompanying text (providing a representative 
list of recent large-scale data breaches). 
 8.  See Robert Faturechi, FTC Calls for Curbs on Consumer Data 
Collection, L.A. TIMES (May 27, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-ftc-
data-brokers-20140528-story.html (last visited May 12, 2016) (“The FTC found 
that data brokers collect and store billions of data points covering nearly all 
American consumers.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 9.  See Matt Johansen, Top 10 Web Hacking Techniques of 2014, 
WHITEHAT SEC. (Mar. 19, 2015), https://blog.whitehatsec.com/top-10-web-
hacking-techniques-of-2014/ (last visited May 12, 2016) (listing over thirty 
different data theft techniques used in 2014 alone) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 10.  See Tim Chen, Identity Theft: Your Chances of Being a Victim, U.S. 
NEWS (Mar. 23, 2011), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/my-
money/2011/03/23/identity-theft-your-chances-of-being-a-victim (last visited 
May 12, 2016) (noting that, in 2011 alone, 250,854 Americans were victims of 
identity theft) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 11.  See ARVIND NARAYANAN & VITALY SHMATIKOVV, MYTHS AND FALLACIES OF 
“PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION” 1 (2010) (determining PII includes 
Social Security numbers, driver’s license numbers, and financial accounts). 
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personal data—particularly social security numbers—to open 
false credit cards, gain access to private bank accounts, etc.; 
others make a profit selling the PII on the Internet.12 
Dozens of large companies—and even the federal 
government—became data breach victims over the past decade.13 
The most notable commercial data breaches targeted CareFirst 
BlueCross BlueShield, J.P. Morgan, Yahoo, Neiman Marcus, 
Target, Sony PlayStation and Online Entertainment Networks, 
Citigroup, MasterCard, Visa, and Starbucks.14 The Ashley 
Madison data breach in particular serves to remind the public 
and the legal community of data breaches’ harsh consequences.15 
                                                                                                     
 12.  See Michael Riley, Stolen Credit Cards Go for $3.50 at Amazon-Like 
Online Bazaar, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 20, 2011, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-12-20/stolen-credit-cards-go-for-3-
50-each-at-online-bazaar-that-mimics-amazon (last visited May 12, 2016) 
(reporting that identity thieves steal 8.4 million credit card numbers on average 
annually, many of which can be sold at around $3.50 per card) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). The information normally includes the 
cardholder’s name, address, and credit card security code. Id. 
 13.  See Ellen Nakashima, Hacks of OPM Databases Compromised 22.1 
Million People, Federal Authorities Say, WASH. POST (July 9, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/2015/07/09/hack-of-
security-clearance-system-affected-21-5-million-people-federal-authorities-say/ 
(last visited May 12, 2016) (examining the cyber attack against the federal 
government where the personal information of 22 million government employees 
was compromised) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 14.  See Data Breach Lawsuits and Information, MORGAN & MORGAN, 
http://www.forthepeople.com/class-action-lawyers/data-breaches/ (last visited 
May 12, 2016) (providing a list of notable data breaches within the past ten 
years) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Other large-scale 
data breaches targeted Premera Blue Cross, UPS Stores, Inc., Lowe’s, eBay, 
Kaiser Permanente, Sears Holdings Corp., New York State Electric & Gas Co., 
Valve/Steam, Lincoln Financial Group, Gap, Staples, and Hewlett Packard. Id. 
 15.  See Robin Levinson King, Ashley Madison Customers Complain of 
Blackmail After Hack, TORONTO STAR (Nov. 18, 2015), 
http://www.thestar.com/news/privacy-blog/2015/11/ashley-madison-customers-
complain-of-blackmail-after-hack.html (last visited May 12, 2016) (discussing 
the blackmailing of several Ashley Madison customers following the breach) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Sara Malm, Two Suicides Are 
Linked to Ashley Madison Leak: Texas Police Chief Takes His Own Life Just 
Days After His Email Is Leaked in Cheating Website Hack, DAILY MAIL (Aug. 24, 
2015), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3208907/The-Ashley-Madison-
suicide-Texas-police-chief-takes-life-just-days-email-leaked-cheating-website-
hack.html (last visited May 12, 2016) (reporting on two suicides allegedly 
connected to the Ashley Madison data breach) (on file with Washington and Lee 
Law Review); Zetter, supra note 5 (finding that the stolen information contained 
names, email addresses, home addresses, amounts paid and the last four digits 
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The issue of Article III standing16 for data breach lawsuits is 
especially relevant in the Ashley Madison data breach.17 A 
plaintiff must suffer an invasion of a legally protected interest to 
establish standing; this invasion must be “concrete and 
particularized” and “actual or imminent.”18 This presents a 
serious issue for victims of data breach; an unknown party 
wrongfully accessed their data, thereby increasing their risk of 
identity theft, but causing no actual injury to confer standing to 
sue.19 Furthermore, courts’ interpretations of what constitutes an 
imminent injury are divided, to say the least.20 This presents a 
scenario where the parties have not suffered an “actual injury,”21 
and, under some courts’ rulings, their increased risk of harm does 
not rise to the “imminent” level.22 Yet, they will likely be seeking 
a remedy from the service provider for injuries that have not yet 
occurred.23  
                                                                                                     
of customer credit cards). 
 16.  See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (granting federal courts jurisdiction over 
“cases and controversies . . . between citizens of different states”); infra Part II 
(discussing the tripartite Article III standing requirements of injury in fact, 
causation, and redressability). 
 17.  See infra Part II.B (discussing the relative ease of establishing standing 
once leaked information is used against the consumer—as compared to where 
the customer has yet to be “injured”).  
 18.  See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) 
(establishing fundamental article III standing requirements). 
 19.  See infra Parts III–VI (arguing that a targeted breach increases a 
victim’s risk of identity theft to a level that any future harm can be considered 
imminent).  
 20.  See infra notes 24–25 (comparing the vastly different outcomes for 
similar cases at the district and circuit court levels). 
 21.  See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (establishing the “actual injury” 
requirement as “indispensible” to a plaintiff’s case). 
 22.  See cases cited infra notes 24–25 (listing data breach class action cases, 
many of which the courts rule against plaintiffs who were not yet victims of 
identity theft). 
 23.  See David S. Almeida & Mark Eisen, Barbarians at the Gate: Seventh 
Circuit Finds Article III Standing for Data Breach Class Actions, LEXOLOGY: 
CLASS ACTION DEF. STRATEGY BLOG (July 24, 2015), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=4fd79797-228b-4930-9351-
11f3145cb1ef (last visited May 12, 2016) (finding that “[t]he overwhelming 
majority of courts . . . dismiss data breach actions for the simple reason that 
until a consumer suffers actual identity theft, she lacks Article III standing to 
sue”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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Outcomes are mixed at the federal district court level,24 but 
the few circuits to address the issue have traditionally been 
                                                                                                     
 24.  Compare Maglio v. Advocate Health & Hosps. Corp., 2015 IL App (2d) 
140782-U, at *6 (Ill. App. Ct. June 2, 2015) (dismissing an action where burglars 
stole company computers with customer information for failure to show actual 
harm because “[t]he increased risk that plaintiffs will be identity theft victims 
at some indeterminate point in the future . . . . [D]id not constitute an injury 
sufficient to confer standing”), In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup 
Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 28 (D.D.C. 2014) (“[I]ncreased risk of 
harm alone does not constitute an injury in fact. Nor do measures taken to 
prevent a future, speculative harm.”), Allison v. Aetna, Inc., No. CIV.A. 09-2560, 
2010 WL 3719243, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2010) (holding that the plaintiff 
lacked standing where an online phishing scam compromised plaintiff’s PII, but 
the plaintiff had not yet suffered concrete harm), Amburgy v. Express Scripts, 
Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1051–53 (E.D. Mo. 2009) (ruling that the risk of 
future harm posed by future data theft where the harm may not occur is too 
speculative), Key v. DSW, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d 684, 690 (S.D. Ohio 2006) 
(same), Polanco v. Omnicell, Inc., No. 13–1417, 2013 WL 6823265, at *14 (D.N.J. 
Dec. 26, 2013) (relying on Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA and Reilly v. Ceridian 
Corp. to conclude that mere loss of data, without misuse, is not “an injury 
sufficient to confer standing”), Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc., 27 F. 
Supp. 3d 871, 876 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (“Clapper compels rejection of Strautins' claim 
that an increased risk of identity theft is sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact 
requirement for standing.”), Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 
2d. 646, 660 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (holding that the increased risk of future harm 
relying on the occurrence of future criminal actions by independent decision-
makers was not imminent), and In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., No. 12-CV-
8617, 2013 WL 4759588, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2013) (“The Complaint alleges 
Plaintiffs incurred expenses to mitigate an increased risk of identity theft or 
fraud, but it does not allege what those expenses are with any specificity. Even 
if specific expenses had been alleged, such expenses would not qualify as actual 
injuries under Clapper.” (emphasis added)), with In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 
66 F. Supp. 3d. 1197, 1212 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (limiting Clapper to its facts and 
granting standing on the grounds that the data breach placed plaintiffs in 
immediate danger), Enslin v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 2:14-CV-06476, 2015 WL 
5729241, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2015) (finding standing where plaintiff’s bank 
account had been fraudulently accessed—representing an actual injury), In re 
Target Corp. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1159 (D. Minn. 2014) 
(finding plaintiffs to have standing where their credit cards were used to make 
unauthorized purchases), In re Zappos.com, Inc., No. 3:12-CV-00325-RCJ, 2013 
WL 4830497, at *3 (D. Nev. Sept. 9, 2013) (finding standing where the plaintiffs 
suffered “actual fraud or identity theft”), Holmes v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 
5:08–CV–00205–R, 2012 WL 2873892, at *5 (W.D. Ky. July 12, 2012) (finding 
that the plaintiffs suffered an injury-in-fact because they were required to 
expend time and money to protect their identity), and Moyer v. Michaels Stores, 
Inc., No. 14 C 561, 2014 WL 3511500, at *6 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2014) 
(distinguishing Clapper, “conclud[ing] that the elevated risk of identity theft 
stemming from the data breach at Michaels is sufficiently imminent to give 
Plaintiffs standing”). “This conclusion follows from Pisciotta and is consistent 
with a host of Supreme Court decisions finding standing based on an imminent 
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favorable to plaintiffs.25 More recently, however, district courts 
interpret  Clapper v. Amnesty International USA26—a non-data 
breach Supreme Court case published in 2013—to foreclose the 
use of imminent injury in data breach lawsuits, trumping the 
plaintiff-friendly circuit opinions.27 The majority of post-Clapper 
district court cases applied Clapper—incorrectly—to dismiss 
imminent injury claims for lack of standing.28 These courts 
focused on the “injury” prong, reasoning that, if a plaintiff’s 
future injury relies on speculation, then it is not certainly 
impending and, therefore, it fails the imminent injury 
requirement.29 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Remijas 
v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC,30 however, broke this district 
court trend and found standing in a data breach action despite 
the Supreme Court’s Clapper decision, finding that Clapper did 
                                                                                                     
risk of future injury.” Moyer, 2014 WL 3511500, at *6. 
 25.  Compare Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 
2007) (concluding that “the injury-in-fact requirement can be satisfied by a 
threat of future harm or by an act which harms the plaintiff only by increasing 
the risk of future harm that the plaintiff would have otherwise faced, absent the 
defendants actions” (emphasis added)), and Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 
F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that faced “a credible threat of harm” 
that was “both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical” (internal 
citations omitted)), with Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 437 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(denying standing for plaintiff’s claims of harm from future identity theft on the 
grounds that they were hypothetical and conjectural), and Reilly v. Ceridian 
Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding no injury-in-fact where the 
plaintiff’'s PII was accessed but not yet misused). 
 26. 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
 27.  See id. at 1147 (denying standing for plaintiffs on the grounds that, 
because a speculative chain of events had to occur for the plaintiffs to be injured, 
the injury was not imminent). Clapper is the seminal case courts use to address 
whether an “uninjured” plaintiff suing for damages has standing resulting—
many courts have followed the Clapper Court’s reasoning in denying standing. 
See infra Part III.A.3 (discussing cases denying standing in light of Clapper 
even though Clapper was not a data breach case). 
 28.  See infra Part III.C (critiquing a few notable district court 
interpretations of Clapper). 
 29.  See Galaria, 998 F. Supp. 2d. at 654–55 (interpreting Clapper as a 
barrier for data breach plaintiffs who have yet to suffer an actual injury (citing 
Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1143)). Speculation is inherent in any imminence theory 
and courts have incorrectly interpreted Clapper to disallow any speculation and 
heighten standing requirements altogether. See infra Part V.A.2 (arguing that 
even the certainly impending standard allows a degree of speculation). 
 30.  794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015). 
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not change the law on standing.31 In light of this recent circuit 
split, this Note examines whether plaintiffs in data breach 
lawsuits can raise the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Remijas to 
argue standing even without suffering an actual injury.32 
Specifically, it asks whether standing for data breach lawsuits 
can survive on imminent injury alone after Clapper.33 
Part II of this Note provides a brief history and discussion of 
standing.34 This discussion establishes the fundamental elements 
of standing a plaintiff must satisfy for her claim to be heard in 
court.35 It focuses on the injury-in-fact prong, but the issue 
warrants a brief discussion of the causation and redressability 
elements as well.36 Part II further discusses the standing issues 
that data breach plaintiffs face;37 it describes how courts consider 
claims of actual harms, future harms, and mitigation costs in 
determining standing.38 Part III provides a selective discussion of 
the current state of data breach standing case law.39 This 
                                                                                                     
 31.  See id. at 693 (holding that plaintiffs in a data breach involving 
Neiman Marcus “should not have to wait until hackers commit identity theft or 
credit-card fraud to give the class standing, because there is an ‘objectively 
reasonable likelihood’ that such an injury will occur” (citing Clapper v. Amnesty 
Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1338, 1147 (2013)). For an article discussing the Seventh 
Circuit’s denial of an en banc review for Remijas, see Mao Shiokura, 7th Cir: 
Neiman Marcus Data Breach Injuries Sufficient for Article III Standing, IMPACT 
LITIG. J. (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.impactlitigation.com/2015/09/23/7th-cir-
neiman-marcus-data-breach-injuries-sufficient-for-article-iii-standing/ (last 
visited May 12, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 32.  See infra Part V (positing that Remijas properly limits Clapper to its 
facts, rendering it inapplicable in data breach context). 
 33.  See infra Part V (defending the Remijas and Adobe courts’ 
interpretation of Clapper). 
 34.  See infra Part II (setting forth requirements for Article III standing and 
discussing their respective relevance with regard to data breach). 
 35.  See infra Part II (discussing the actual or imminent injury, traceability, 
and causation requirements of Article III standing). 
 36.  See infra Part II (noting that, even if a plaintiff establishes an injury, 
the injury must be “fairly traceable” to the defendants actions and a favorable 
court ruling must be capable of providing a remedy for the alleged harms). 
 37.  See infra Part III (requiring data breach victims, who yet to have their 
information misused, to establish that any future harms are so imminent as to 
prove an almost inevitable likelihood of them occurring).  
 38.  See infra Part III (discussing the difficulties facing data breach 
plaintiffs who have yet to suffer actual harms—such as fraudulent credit card 
transactions). 
 39.  See infra Part IV (analyzing the material factual distinctions between 
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discussion includes pre-Clapper circuit court cases ruling for and 
against standing. Pre-Clapper case law is particularly relevant 
because, this Note argues, Clapper did not change the law and 
the pre-Clapper standards still apply.40 Part III also discusses 
Clapper as well as the cases that interpret it to foreclose future 
injury claims in data breach cases.41 At the same time, Part III 
introduces the cases that correctly apply Clapper and take it for 
what it is; a non-data breach case with minimal to no effects on 
standing law.42 Most importantly, Part IV introduces Remijas—
the first post-Clapper circuit court to consider imminent injury in 
data breach lawsuits.43 
Finally, Part V argues that Clapper should be limited to its 
facts and applied only to cases where a chain of events is truly 
speculative and, therefore, not sufficiently imminent.44 But, 
Clapper does not apply where a data-breach directly jeopardizes 
personal customer information and no additional steps are 
required for identity thieves to use the data against the victims.45 
Part V argues that the increased risk of identity theft is not 
“possible”46 when hackers have direct access to the personal 
information; rather, it is “imminent.”47 Identity theft is 
sufficiently imminent to be considered “certainly impending” 
                                                                                                     
cases in which standing was granted and when standing was denied). 
 40.  See infra Part III.A (discussing pre-Clapper circuit court precedent). 
 41.  See infra Parts III.B–C (analyzing Clapper and discussing the lower 
courts’ reasoning for applying it broadly). 
 42.  See infra Part III.D (citing cases that limit Clapper to its facts). 
 43.  See infra Part IV (setting forth and distinguishing federal and circuit 
courts’ reasoning for granting standing in light of Clapper). 
 44.  See infra Part V (arguing that, while Clapper’s holding was proper in 
light of the facts, the Supreme Court did not intend to tighten the current 
standard for standing). 
 45.  The Remijas court employed similar reasoning. See Remijas v. Neiman 
Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 696 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding that, once data 
thieves obtained unencrypted customer data, the breach created a “substantial 
risk” of future identity theft). 
 46.  See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1154 (2013) 
(denying standing where plaintiffs argument relied merely on possible 
government actions unknown to the plaintiffs). 
 47.  See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 156–60 (1990) (establishing 
the requirement that an injury must be “certainly impending” to create an 
imminent injury sufficient to confer standing). 
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when hackers have unfettered access to data.48 This Note argues 
that once PII is stolen and readily accessible, there is a cognizable 
imminent injury. At that point, identity theft is no longer a 
question of “if,” but rather, a question of “when.” 
II. Constitutional Standing 
A. Fundamental Principles 
“No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper 
role in our system of government than the constitutional 
limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases and 
controversies.”49 Standing is based on the fundamental principle 
of separation of powers and is designed to prevent the judicial 
branch from usurping the powers of other political branches.50 In 
the context of government action, if a court were to accept any 
case on mere speculation or generalized grievances, it would be 
unrightfully asserting its decisionmaking power in a field 
specifically reserved to the Legislative or Executive Branches.51 
                                                                                                     
 48.  See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1141 (finding that plaintiffs’ injuries were too 
speculative to be considered imminent because a series of five events needed to 
occur before plaintiffs were actually injured).  
 49.  See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006) (denying 
standing for plaintiff taxpayers alleging a decrease in city tax funds where an 
automobile manufacturer was given a tax credit, and thus, sustaining an injury 
city residents). This case exemplifies the importance of standing acting as a 
filter, protecting the courts and government entities from generalized 
grievances; in this case, taxpayer complaints. Id. at 348. 
 50.  See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1138 (using this foundational principle of 
standing to apply a rigorous standard of review to the particular set of facts 
presented before the court); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 
(1974) (“Relaxation of standing requirements is directly related to the expansion 
of judicial power.”). 
 51.  The Court shows its hesitance to confer standing—particularly where a 
plaintiff challenges a government statute or action—where the harm is 
speculative. See, e.g., Richardson, 418 U.S. at 176–77 (finding that plaintiff’s 
lack of access to CIA spending records and his resulting inability to “properly 
fulfill his obligations as a member of the electorate” was a generalized grievance 
and insufficient to be considered an injury-in-fact); Schlesinger v. Reservists 
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220 (1974) (reaffirming the principle that 
standing cannot be predicated on an interest “which is held in common by all 
members of the public, because of the necessarily abstract nature of the injury 
all citizens share”); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972) (denying standing 
for plaintiffs—who argued that military program permitting surveillance of 
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This foundational principle mandating judicial wariness of 
speculative harms present one of the largest hurdles for data 
breach plaintiffs.52 
To successfully bring a claim in federal court, a plaintiff must 
satisfy general Article III standing requirements.53 The burden is 
on the plaintiff54 to show: (1) that he has “suffered an ‘injury in 
fact,” i.e. “an invasion of a legally protected interested which is 
(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not 
‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical’”;55 (2) a causal connection between 
the injury and the conduct complained of—“the injury has to be 
fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not 
the result of the independent action of some third party not 
before the court”; and (3) “it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely 
‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable 
decision.’”56 Each of the elements must be proven “with the 
manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages 
of the litigation.”57 In the pleading stage, a court presumes the 
existence of the specific facts upon which a plaintiff’s general 
factual allegations of injury rely.58 To survive a summary 
judgment motion, a plaintiff must prove injury by pointing to 
specific facts.59 In the class action context, plaintiffs representing 
                                                                                                     
lawful and peaceful activity chilled the freedom of speech—because they did not 
present a threat of specific future harm or present objective harm); Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (noting that the nonjusticiability of “political 
questions” stems from the separation-of-powers principle). 
 52.  See infra Part III.A (discussing cases where courts incorrectly apply 
this principle to deny standing even where speculation is minimal).  
 53.  See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013) 
(“Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts’ jurisdiction to certain 
‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’”). Standing is “one element of the case-or-
controversy requirement.” Id. 
 54.  See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (requiring 
all plaintiffs seeking federal jurisdiction to establish all three elements of 
standing). 
 55.  See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–02 (1983) (denying standing 
where plaintiff alleged an imminent injury stemming from a new police 
chokehold technique).  
 56.  See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. 
 57.  Id. at 561. 
 58.  See id. (requiring courts to presume the existence of specific facts upon 
which a plaintiff’s claim of injury relies in the pleading stage). 
 59.  See id. (discussing the heightened burden of proof on plaintiffs at the 
summary judgment stage). 
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a class must show that they themselves have been personally 
injured; showing an injury to other members of the class is 
insufficient to confer standing for the named plaintiffs.60 
B. Actual and Imminent Harm 
An actual injury easily satisfies the injury-in-fact prong.61 An 
imminent injury will occur in the future; the only question is, 
“how soon?” To establish standing, an injury-in-fact must be 
“‘distinct and palpable’62 as opposed to ‘abstract.’”63A plaintiff can 
easily establish the injury-in-fact prong by pointing to an actual 
injury.64 For example, the court in Enslin v. Coca-Cola Company65 
found that the plaintiff established a distinct and palpable actual 
harm by showing unauthorized credit card use, fraudulent 
withdrawals from bank accounts, and unauthorized issuances of 
credit cards after a series of laptop thefts.66 Similarly, in In re 
Target Corporation Data Security Breach Litigation,67 the court 
                                                                                                     
 60.  See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996) (noting that plaintiffs 
cannot sue on behalf of a class if they themselves have not suffered an actual or 
imminent injury). 
 61.  See Enslin v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 2:14-CV-06476, 2015 WL 5729241, at 
*14 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2015) (granting standing where plaintiffs suffered actual 
injuries stemming from laptop theft (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 
155 (1990))). 
 62.  See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) (denying standing where 
plaintiffs sued a town for denying residence to low and moderate income 
individuals, finding that plaintiffs did not demonstrate that their immediate 
interests would be harmed without a favorable ruling).  
 63.  See O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) (denying standing 
where plaintiffs alleged that racially discriminatory administration of the civil 
justice system deprived them of their constitutional rights, finding any future 
injury too abstract). O’Shea established the “real and immediate” standard that 
Krottner later uses to confer standing for imminent injury. Id. at 494. 
 64.  See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992) (noting 
that for actual injuries, “the existence of standing is clear, though the precise 
extent of harm remains to be determined at trial”). 
 65.  2015 WL 5729241. 
 66.  See id. at *6 (distinguishing plaintiff’s injuries from cases where the 
plaintiff had yet to be injured by a data breach). The stolen laptops contained 
the plaintiff’s PII in an unencrypted state. Id. 
 67.  66 F. Supp. 3d 1154 (D. Minn. 2014). 
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granted standing where plaintiffs were subjected to fraudulent 
transactions on their credit cards.68  
Imminent injuries are far less clear and are the source of 
myriad standing disputes in the data breach context.69 To 
establish an “imminent” injury, there must be either a 
“substantial risk”70 of future injury or the harm must be 
“certainly impending.”71 The two standards are not 
interchangeable and may possibly lead to different outcomes.72 
For example, the Court in Whitmore v. Arkansas73 found that 
possible future injury is insufficient to confer standing; rather, 
the harm must be certainly impending.74 In Whitmore, a plaintiff 
attempted to sue on behalf of a fellow inmate, arguing that the 
inmate’s sentence could adversely affect his own sentencing.75 
The court denied standing, finding that any future injury was not 
certainly impending, given the difference of the inmates’ 
                                                                                                     
 68.  See id. at 1159 (conferring standing after a corporate server containing 
customer credit cards was breached and customers faced fraudulent 
transactions on their respective credit cards). 
 69.  See cases cited supra notes 24–25 (listing relevant data breach law 
suits considering both actual and imminent harm). 
 70.  See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 153–54 (2010) 
(finding that plaintiff alfalfa farmers established a “reasonable probability” that 
their organic alfalfa crops would be infected with an engineered gene—Roundup 
Ready Alfalfa—if it were completely deregulated). In Monsanto, the Court found 
a substantial risk of imminent harm because plaintiffs would, for example, be 
forced to continually test their organic alfalfa for contamination. See id. at 154 
(finding that the resulting mitigation measures would create an irreparable 
harm justifying injunctive relief).  
 71.  See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990) (establishing that 
a threatened injury must be “certainly impending” and “allegations of possible 
future injury” are not sufficient). 
 72.  See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 n.5 (2013) 
(suggesting that the “substantial risk” standard set forth by Monsanto Co. v. 
Geertson Seed Farms is separate, distinct, and a lower threshold than the 
“certainly impending” standard set forth by Whitmore v. Arkansas). 
 73.  495 U.S. 149 (1990). 
 74.  See id. at 158 (“A threatened injury must be ‘certainly impending’ to 
constitute an injury in fact.” (citing Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298 
(1979))). 
 75.  See id. at 159–60 (finding plaintiffs argument—that the inmates 
sentencing would immediately impact his own sentencing under Arkansas’ 
comparative review in death penalty cases—unpersuasive, concluding that any 
future injury was not certainly impending). 
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respective crimes.76 The Court in Blum v. Yaretski77 granted 
standing where a threat was “sufficiently substantial.”78 In 
Monsanto Company v. Geertson Seed Farms,79 the Court granted 
standing where there was a “substantial risk” of future harm.80  
III. The Status of Data Breach Case Law 
Before Clapper, there was well-established case law 
regarding imminent injury in data breach lawsuits.81 This Note 
argues that Clapper does nothing to alter them.82 The cases 
finding standing all implicitly focus on an unauthorized third 
party gaining access to unencrypted PII. The pre-Clapper cases 
suggest that a successfully carried out cyber-attack on a data 
network establishes a certainly impending injury.83  
A. The Circuits’ Slippery Slope 
On August 23, 2007, the Seventh Circuit in Pisciotta v. Old 
National Bancorp84 established what is likely the most lenient 
injury-in-fact requirement for standing in the data breach 
context.85 The court found that a plaintiff must only show that 
defendants created an increased risk of future harm to establish 
                                                                                                     
 76.  See id. at 157 (determining that a court’s sentencing of a mass 
murderer was not similar enough to a robbery-murder for any injury to be 
certainly impending). 
 77.  457 U.S. 991 (1982). 
 78.  See id. at 1000. The Court conferred standing where plaintiff—a 
member of a nursing home—faced the possibility of being transferred to a lower 
level of care. Id.  
 79.  561 U.S. 139 (2010). 
 80.  See supra note 70 (discussing Monsanto). 
 81.  See infra Part III.A (analyzing circuit court precedent that tends to lean 
in favor of data breach victims arguing imminent injury). 
 82.  See infra Part V (arguing that the Krottner and Pisciotta standards 
remain forceful in light of a properly interpreted Clapper). 
 83.  See infra Part V (arguing that this is the correct outcome). 
 84.  499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 85.  See id. at 632 (granting standing in a “sophisticated, intentional and 
malicious” intrusion by hackers to Old National Bancorp’s website). 
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standing.86 In Pisciotta, defendant Old National Bancorp (ONB) 
ran a website where individuals applied for ONB’s banking 
services.87 Plaintiffs accessed the website in 2002 and 2004, 
respectively, providing various forms of PII.88 In 2005, ONB’s 
website hosting facility experienced a security breach that the 
court labeled as “sophisticated, intentional and malicious.”89  
The plaintiff’s theory for standing relied on credit monitoring 
expenses incurred and similar future expenses resulting from the 
breach.90 The plaintiffs did not, however, “allege any completed 
direct financial loss to their accounts.”91 The court was not 
persuaded by the more restrictive standing requirements district 
courts’ followed in similar data breach contexts.92 Rather, the 
court analogized this suit to toxic tort and medical malpractice 
                                                                                                     
 86.  See id. at 634 (overturning the district court’s dismissal for lack of 
standing). 
 87.  Id. at 631. 
 88.  See id. (“[S]ome forms require the customer or potential customer’s 
name, address, social security number, driver’s license number, date of birth, 
mother’s maiden name and credit card or other financial account numbers.”). 
 89.  Id. at 632. It appears that the court attempted to use this as a factor to 
distinguish the present case from prior district court precedent denying 
standing. See infra note 92 (discussing cases denying standing where customer 
PII was misplaced or inadvertently stolen). 
 90.  See id. at 631 (“[Plaintiffs] requested compensation for past and future 
credit monitoring services that they have obtained in response to the 
compromise of their personal data through ONB's website.”). 
 91.  See id. (stating that plaintiffs only needed to show an increase risk of 
injury, and the fact that the breach might cause greater harm in the future does 
“not affect the standing inquiry”). 
 92.  See Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7–8 
(D.D.C. 2007) (denying standing where plaintiffs did not suffer actual harm 
from identity theft after an ING employee’s personal laptop containing their PII 
was stolen in a home burglary). The court denied standing because plaintiffs did 
not allege that the laptop was stolen to access their PII or that their PII was 
even accessed. Id. The court determined that the injuries were founded on 
speculation and, therefore, insufficient to establish an imminent injury. Id.; see 
also Giordano v. Wachovia Sec., LLC., No. 06-476 JBS, 2006 WL 2177036, at 
*12 (D. N.J. July 31, 2006) (denying standing where a printed list containing 
plaintiff’s PII was lost during shipping but did not result in harm to the 
plaintiff). The court denied standing because plaintiff failed to allege: (1) That 
the purpose of the burglary was to obtain her PII; (2) an actual injury; or (3) 
that she actually suffered identity theft. Id. at *5; see also Key v. DSW, Inc., 454 
F. Supp. 2d 684, 690 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (denying standing where an unauthorized 
access of customer PII occurred but plaintiff failed to allege that a third party 
intended to use her financial information or steal her identity). 
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suits, following the reasoning of several non-data breach sister 
circuit court opinions.93 Consequently, the court found that a 
mere increased risk of harm was a cognizable injury sufficient to 
confer standing.94 
On October 6, 2010, the Ninth Circuit in Krottner v. 
Starbucks Corporation95 took Pisciotta’s lead.96 In Krottner, 
thieves stole a laptop from a Starbucks location containing 
unencrypted names, social security numbers, and addresses of 
over 97,000 employees.97 Plaintiffs were former Starbucks 
employees.98 Starbucks notified all affected employees and 
advised them to monitor their credit as a precautionary 
measure.99 Starbucks further provided one year of free credit 
monitoring service.100 Plaintiffs’ standing argument relied on the 
substantial amount of time and money spent to monitor their 
credit and the additional expenses that would arise after their 
complimentary credit monitoring expired.101 One plaintiff further 
alleged that there was an unauthorized attempt in December 
2008 to open a new bank account with his social security 
                                                                                                     
 93.  See Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 264–65 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(noting, in dicta, that exposure to toxic substances could establish a risk of 
future harm sufficient to constitute an injury-in-fact); Sutton v. St. Jude Med. 
S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 568, 574–75 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that a defective medical 
implant creates a increased risk of future harm sufficient to establish a 
cognizable injury); Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 
947–48 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that possible future injury is sufficient to confer 
standing with regard to environmental harm); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding that 
increased risk of environmental harm is a cognizable injury sufficient to confer 
standing). 
 94.  See Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(“[T]he injury-in-fact requirement can be satisfied by a threat of future harm or 
by an act which harms the plaintiff only by increasing the risk of future harm 
that the plaintiff would’ve otherwise faced, absent the defendant’s actions.”). 
 95.  628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 96.  See id. at 1140 (conferring Article III standing, but ultimately affirming 
the lower court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s state-law claims). 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. at 1141. 
 100.  See id. (providing free credit monitoring even where Starbucks had no 
indication that the information was misused). 
 101.  See id. (listing mitigation measures such as placing fraud alerts on 
credit cards and spending extra time monitoring 401(k) accounts). 
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number.102 None of the plaintiffs suffered any financial loss in the 
form of identity theft.103 
The Ninth Circuit found that one plaintiff’s “generalized 
anxiety and stress” allegations were the only present injuries 
alleged.104 These conferred standing for only one plaintiff.105 With 
regard to the plaintiffs’ future harms and mitigation argument, 
the court—much like Pisciotta—relied on Century Delta Water 
Agency v. United States.106 It analogized an increased risk of 
identity theft to proposed governmental action creating a 
substantial risk of future harm in the environmental context.107 
Finding Pisciotta persuasive, the court established its own 
immediate injury standard: There is an injury-in-fact “if a 
plaintiff faces a ‘credible threat of harm,’108 the harm being ‘both 
real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical.’”109 The court 
found that the laptop theft created credible threat of real and 
imminent harm; most importantly, the court found that the 
harms were not conjectural or hypothetical—i.e. not speculative—
                                                                                                     
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. at 1142. Standing requires a plaintiff to show harm; an injury to one 
party does not grant standing to the entire class. See Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (“[T]he plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury 
in fact’ . . . .” (emphasis added)). “The ‘injury in fact’ test requires more than an 
injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the party seeking review be 
himself among the injured.” Id. at 563 (emphasis added). 
 105.  See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(relying on Supreme Court precedent to grant standing for anxiety caused by 
the potentially “‘devastating’ consequences” surrounding a possible disclosure of 
Social Security numbers (quoting Doe v. Chan, 540 U.S. 614, 617–18 (2004))). 
 106.  See 306 F.3d 938, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he possibility of future injury 
may be sufficient to confer standing . . . threatened injury constitutes ‘injury in 
fact.’”). 
 107.  See id. at 948 (finding standing for plaintiff farmers who established a 
substantial risk of their crops being destroyed by new governmental initiatives 
altering discharge of water from a reservoir). The court also analogized to cases 
of exposure to toxic chemicals where defendants failed to provide medical 
screening. See Pritikin v. Dept’t of Energy, 254 F.3d 791,796–97 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(finding that defendant’s failure to pay for plaintiff’s medical screening after 
their exposure to toxic substances created a sufficient injury in fact). 
 108.  See generally Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 950 
(9th Cir. 2002) (finding standing where there was a substantial risk of 
irreparable environmental damage). 
 109.  See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (requiring a plaintiff 
to show a high degree of immediacy to confer standing). 
78 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 61 (2016) 
because the laptop was already stolen.110 Therefore, to the Ninth 
Circuit, theft of a laptop containing unencrypted PII created an 
imminent injury sufficient to confer standing. Until 2011, it 
appeared that similarly situated data breach victims had their 
foot in the door.111 
And then came Reilly v. Ceridian Corporation.112 On 
December 12, 2011, the Third Circuit filed its Reilly decision, 
denying standing and distinguishing itself from Pisciotta and 
Krottner.113 The court followed an extremely restrictive standard 
that would deny standing in almost all data breach suits relying 
on imminent injury.114 In Reilly, plaintiffs were Brach Eichler law 
firm (the Firm) employees.115 The Firm was one of defendant 
Ceridian’s—a payroll-processing firm—clients.116 In December 
2009, unknown hackers infiltrated Ceridian, potentially gaining 
access to customer PII.117 It was inconclusive whether the 
hackers actually read, understood, or copied the data.118 Ceridian 
sent letters to its customers informing them of their potential risk 
of identity theft and provided them with one year of free credit 
monitoring.119 As a result, the plaintiffs filed a complaint against 
Ceridian alleging an increased risk of identity theft, credit 
                                                                                                     
 110.  See Krottner, 628 F.3d at 948 (noting that, if the laptop had not been 
stolen and plaintiffs alleged an increased risk of future theft, the claim would be 
“far less credible”). 
 111.  The Ninth Circuit followed Pisciotta’s reasoning in reaching an 
identical conclusion earlier that same year. See Ruiz v. Gap, 380 F. App’x 689, 
691 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming the lower court in granting standing where 
thieves stole a laptop containing 750,000 job applicants’’ PII). At the district 
court level, it was unclear whether the laptops were stolen for their data or for 
their intrinsic value. Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 908, 913 (N.D. Cal. 
2009). Regardless, the court was persuaded by Pisciotta and district court 
precedent. See id. (granting standing for increased risk of future harm 
regardless of the thief’s intentions (citing Caudle v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & 
Crosby, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 273, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 2008))). 
 112.  664 F.3d 38 (3rd Cir. 2011). 
 113.  See id. at 44 (criticizing Pisciotta and Krottner’s standing analyses). 
 114.  See id. at 43 (finding that injuries relying on actions by unknown third 
parties were too speculative to be considered imminent). 
 115.  Id. at 40. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  See id. (noting that the stolen PII included first and last names, social 
security numbers, and in some cases, birthdays and bank account numbers). 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id.  
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monitoring costs to mitigate the alleged risk, and emotional 
distress.120 
The Third Circuit denied standing on the plaintiffs’ increased 
risk of identity theft argument for three reasons. First, the 
plaintiffs’ standing theory relied on a speculative chain of events, 
thereby failing to show an injury with a high degree of 
immediacy.121 To the court, the fact that hacker had to read and 
understand the PII, intend to use it to the plaintiffs’ detriment, 
and actually make unauthorized harmful transactions created an 
impermissible level of speculation.122 The court could not find an 
explanation for any future injury without beginning with the 
word “if” and, as such, found the injury to be too speculative.123 
Second, the court found the plaintiffs’ reliance on Pisciotta and 
Krottner unpersuasive.124 This was predominantly because the 
plaintiffs in the present case neither pleaded a “sophisticated, 
intentional and malicious”125 intrusion nor alleged any misuse of 
their PII—i.e. no actual injury.126 
Third, persuaded by district courts, the court refuted 
Pisciotta’s constitutional standing analysis altogether and 
distinguished the present case from Krottner.127 In discrediting 
the Pisciotta analysis, the court determined that Pisciotta 
                                                                                                     
 120.  Id. 
 121.  See id. at 42 (mandating the immediacy requirement as essential to 
preventing the court from ruling on an injury that may never occur (citing Lujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 n.2 (1992))). 
 122.  See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3rd Cir. 2011) (requiring 
this chain of events to produce an injury before plaintiffs had standing, 
therefore, effectively eliminating imminent injury as an option for data breach 
plaintiffs). 
 123.  See id. at 43 (emphasizing that that, in a prior case, the court denied 
standing because plaintiffs could not allege how they “will be injured without 
beginning the explanation with the word ‘if’” (quoting Storino v. Borough of 
Point Pleasant Beach, 322 F.3d 293, 297–98 (2003))). 
 124.  See id. at 44 (distinguishing the circumstances between the present 
case and Pisciotta and Krottner). 
 125.  See Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(finding standard). 
 126.  See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(finding standing). 
 127.  See Amburgy v. Express Scripts, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d. 1046, 1051–53 
(E.D. Mo. 2009) (ruling that the risk of future harm posed by future data theft 
in which the harm may occur is too speculative); Key v. DSW, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 
2d 684, 690 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (same). 
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incorrectly analogized data breach to toxic torts, defective 
medical devices, and environmental harm.128 Importantly, in the 
court’s eyes, injury already occurred in medical-device and toxic 
exposure cases.129 The court opined that the only question left in 
such cases is to what extent or how the injury will manifest, 
whereas in data breach, the plaintiff’s status quo has not 
changed.130 Also, data breach cases do not “hinge on human 
health concerns.”131 The court notes a clear distinction and 
accompanying willingness for courts to confer standing when 
human injury may occur rather than mere monetary harm.132 The 
court also discounted the environmental harm analogy because 
monetary compensation cannot repair environmental damage, 
but it can make a credit fraud victim whole.133 It reasoned that 
mere monetary damages could be recouped once incurred and the 
calculations could be more precise.134 But, before any damages 
occurred, they were entirely speculative.135 
Finding that the harms were purely speculative, the court 
determined that the plaintiffs’ resulting mitigation costs did not 
                                                                                                     
 128.  See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 44 (3rd Cir. 2011) (discussing 
the Pisciotta court’s failure to address the “imminent” and “certainly impending” 
requirements altogether). 
 129.  See Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 264–65 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(noting, in dicta, that exposure to toxic substances could establish a risk of 
future harm sufficient to constitute an injury-in-fact); Sutton v. St. Jude Med. 
S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 568, 574–75 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that a defective medical 
implant creates a increased risk of future harm sufficient to establish a 
cognizable injury). 
 130.  See Reilly, 664 F.3d at 45 (noting that any future harm is not 
quantifiable in data breach, whereas in toxic torts, a significantly heightened 
risk of bodily harm is imminent). In Reilly, the plaintiff’s status was the same as 
if the breach never occurred. Id.  
 131.  Id. 
 132.  See id. (“The deceased, after all, have little use for compensation. This 
case implicates none of these concerns.”). 
 133.  See id. (recognizing that monetary damages may not be adequate in the 
context of environmental harm (citing Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United 
States, 306 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2002))). 
 134.  See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 44–46 (3rd Cir. 2011) (failing 
to recognize that injuries occurring several years after a breach would be 
increasingly difficult to trace to the defendants). 
 135.  See id. (noting that the identity theft may never occur and speculating 
what damages may occur cannot be accurately calculated). 
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result from a cognizable injury-in-fact.136 The court found that 
mitigation costs “protect[ing] against an alleged increased risk of 
identity theft [are] not enough to demonstrate a concrete and 
particularized or actual or imminent injury.”137 Because plaintiffs’ 
mitigation costs were not incurred in fear of a certainly 
impending injury, the costs were no more an actual injury than 
the alleged future harms.138 To the Reilly court, an impermissible 
level of speculation exists between the hackers viewing private 
PII and hackers actually using it to a plaintiff’s detriment. 
Fortunately, the First Circuit at least set a minimum 
threshold requirement. In 2012, the First Circuit in Katz v. 
Pershing, LLC139 recognized a common thread among the circuits: 
hackers actually accessed the data in all three cases.140 The court 
acknowledged access to data as the very minimum and as such, 
denied standing where the plaintiff claimed an increased risk of 
access to her PII.141 In Katz, the plaintiff argued that the 
defendant’s investment services, which gave “end users” 
unfettered access to her PII, left it inadequately protected.142 
These end users were people, such as investment consultants, 
working for the customers’ benefit.143 The court implicitly limited 
Pisciotta’s generalized increased risk of harm standard when it 
denied standing.144 While Katz recognized Pisciotta’s, Krottner’s, 
                                                                                                     
 136.  See id. at 46 (finding that mitigation costs incurred by the plaintiffs’ 
reliance on a speculative or hypothetical harm were done merely to ease their 
fears and not a reasonable response to the given circumstances). 
 137.  Id. (internal citations omitted).  
 138.  See id. (“[Plaintiffs] prophylactically spent money to ease fears of future 
third-party criminality. Such misuse is only speculative—not imminent.”). 
 139.  672 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 140.  See id. at 80 (reading Pisciotta, Krottner, and Reilly to require, at a very 
minimum, that a plaintiff plead actual unauthorized access to PII). “In each of 
the[se cases], the plaintiffs’ data actually had been accessed by one or more 
unauthorized third parties.” Id. 
 141.  See id. (“[T]he plaintiff alleges only that there is an increased risk that 
someone might access her data and that this unauthorized access (if it occurs) 
will increase the risk of identity theft and other inauspicious 
consequences . . . . This omission is fatal . . . .”). 
 142.  Id. at 70. 
 143.  Id. at 69. 
 144.  See id. (requiring actual access, the court implicitly tightened 
Pisciotta’s extremely broad standard). Recall, Pisciotta states that “the injury-
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and Reilly’s inconsistencies, its import is clear: at a bare 
minimum, the plaintiff needed to plead unauthorized access to 
her PII. 
B. Clapper v. Amnesty International USA 
On February 26, 2013, the Supreme Court announced 
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,145 a seminal case on 
Article III standing that some courts interpret as the modern test 
for imminent injury.146 In Clapper, the Court found that the 
plaintiffs’ allegation of future harms and the ensuing mitigation 
costs were based on a chain of events too speculative to be 
considered “certainly impending.”147 The plaintiffs were attorneys 
and human rights organizations148 working with clients that, they 
argued, were likely targets of surveillance under the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act (the 
Act).149 The Act grants the Executive Branch the authority to 
intercept foreign communications.150 Plaintiffs, without any proof 
of the government intercepting their communications, sought a 
                                                                                                     
in-fact requirement can be satisfied by a threat of future harm or by an act 
which harms the plaintiff only by increasing the risk of future harm that the 
plaintiff would have otherwise faced, absent the defendant’s actions.” Pisciotta v. 
Old Nat’l Bancorp., 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added). The 
plaintiff arguably would have satisfied Pisciotta’s concededly loose standard. 
 145.  133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).  
 146.  See infra Parts V (arguing that this is an inappropriate interpretation). 
 147.  Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013). See 
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990) (“Allegations of possible future 
injury do not satisfy the requirements of Art. III. A threatened injury must be 
‘certainly impending’ to constitute injury in fact.” (citing Babbitt v. Farm 
Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979))). 
 148.  See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1145 (noting that plaintiffs clients are located 
in areas likely to be targeted by FISA). 
 149.  See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–
1885(c) (2012) (authorizing and regulating certain governmental electronic 
surveillance of communications for foreign intelligence purposes).  
 150.  FISA permits the President, through the Attorney General, to 
“authorize electronic surveillance . . . solely directed at . . . the acquisition 
of . . . communications used exclusively between or among foreign powers.” Id. 
§ 1802(a). The Attorney General must obtain the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court’s approval. Id. § 1881(g). The Act permits “the targeting of 
persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States to acquire 
foreign intelligence information.” Id. § 1881(a). 
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declaration finding § 1881a unconstitutional and permanently 
enjoining against its use.151 The plaintiffs claimed that § 1881a of 
the Act “compromise[d] their ability to locate witnesses, cultivate 
sources, obtain information, and communicate confidential 
information to their clients.”152 The plaintiffs further claimed that 
the Act forced them to incur considerable expenses traveling to 
their clients to communicate in person.153 
The plaintiffs raised two standing theories: (1) there was an 
“objectively reasonable likelihood” an injury would occur because 
their communications would be intercepted in the future;154 and 
(2) the risk of surveillance under the Act was so substantial that 
the mitigation costs incurred to prevent it “constitute [a] present 
injury . . . fairly traceable to § 1881a.”155 
The district court denied standing.156 The only issue on 
appeal to the Second Circuit was whether the plaintiffs could 
legally assert their claims in federal court.157 The Second Circuit 
reversed the district court’s decision, finding an “objectively 
reasonable likelihood” that the plaintiffs’ future communications 
would be intercepted “at some time in the future.”158 The court 
further found that the plaintiffs suffered present injuries 
                                                                                                     
 151.  The entirety of the plaintiffs’ complaint sought “(1) a declaration that 
§1881a, on its face, violates the Fourth Amendment, the First Amendment, 
Article III, and separation-of-powers principles and (2) a permanent injunction 
against the use of §1881a.” Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1146. 
 152.  Id. at 1145. 
 153.  See id. at 1145–46 (characterizing the plaintiffs mitigation efforts to 
“protect the confidentiality of sensitive communications” as “costly and 
burdensome”). 
 154.  Id. at 1146. The Court also found the Second Circuit’s standard too lax 
to satisfy traditional standing requirements. See id. at 1141 (“[T]he Second 
Circuit's “objectively reasonable likelihood” standard is inconsistent with this 
Court's “threatened injury” requirement.”). 
 155.  Id. at 1146. 
 156.  See Amnesty Int’l U.S. v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633, 645 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding “fear of surveillance” to be an “abstract fear” and 
therefore, insufficient to confer standing). The court also denied the plaintiffs’ 
standing for mitigation costs incurred resulting from the alleged fear of 
surveillance. Id. at 652. 
 157.  See Amnesty Int’l U.S. v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(noting that the court was not answering the question of whether the claims 
were valid). 
 158.  Id. at 118. 
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stemming from the reasonable fear of future harm.159 The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer two specific 
questions: whether the plaintiffs had Article III standing to 
challenge the constitutionality of § 1881a and whether it should 
permanently enjoin the government from authorizing 
surveillance under § 1881a.160 
Importantly, the Court applied an elevated standing 
inquiry.161 This “especially rigorous” standing inquiry applies 
where a dispute forces the Court to decide on the constitutionality 
of Executive or Legislative action.162 The Court has traditionally 
denied standing in cases involving government actions in federal 
intelligence gathering.163 With this heightened standard in mind, 
the Court analyzed the plaintiffs’ claims of future harms and 
mitigation costs, which relied on possible actions by the 
Legislative and Executive Branches.164  
The Court considered several factors.165 First, the plaintiffs 
provided no evidence of intercepted communications under the 
                                                                                                     
 159.  See id. at 138 (“Because standing may be based on a reasonable fear of 
future injury and costs incurred to avoid that injury, and the plaintiffs have 
established that they have a reasonable fear of injury and have incurred costs to 
avoid it, we agree that they have standing.”). 
 160.  See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1142 (2013) 
(discussing whether plaintiffs claim of future harm could be classified as 
“certainly impending” (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990))). 
 161.  See id. at 1147 (acknowledging that Article III standing serves as a 
check on the judiciary “to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp 
the powers of the political branches” (citations omitted)); infra Part III.C 
(discussing cases where this critical distinction was ignored). 
 162.  See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1142 (justifying the Court’s rigorous review 
to prevent the expansion of judicial power in cases affecting the separation of 
powers). 
 163.  See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 180 (1974) (finding that 
plaintiffs needed more than “generalized grievances” to establish standing when 
contesting a statute permitting the Central Intelligence Agency to account for 
its expenditures solely on the certificate of the CIA Director); Schlesinger v. 
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220–21 (1974) (requiring the 
plaintiffs to actually be harmed to have standing to challenge the Armed Forces 
Reserve membership of Members of Congress); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15–
16 (1972) (finding fear of surveillance insufficient to confer standing to challenge 
an Army intelligence-gathering program).  
 164.  See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147 (stating that the Court traditionally 
does not confer standing when the decision would review the actions of other 
political branches). 
 165.  The plaintiffs needed to either establish an actual harm or allege a 
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Act.166 The plaintiffs merely claimed that the Act would harm 
them in the future.167 Second, the plaintiffs’ theory for future 
harms relied on a speculative chain of events.168 A series of five 
events needed to occur before the plaintiffs’ confidential 
communications were intercepted: (1) the government must 
choose to target plaintiffs’ clients;169 (2) the government must opt 
for surveillance under § 1881a;170 (3) the judge serving on the 
Foreign Surveillance Court must find the government’s request 
satisfactory in light of the requirements under §1881a;171 (4) the 
government must succeed in actually acquiring the plaintiffs’ 
contacts’ communications;172 and (5) the plaintiffs must be parties 
                                                                                                     
harm that was certainly impending. See supra Part II (discussing these 
requirements as the constitutional minimum).  
 166.  See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013) (noting 
that the plaintiffs filed suit on the day when the Act was passed—they were not 
yet harmed). 
 167.  Plaintiffs’ claim relied largely on the assumption (with little knowledge 
as to the government’s targeting practices) that government officials would 
target their clients under § 1881a. See id. at 1148 (relying on assumptions that 
communications may be intercepted in an attempt to classify mitigation costs as 
harms sufficient to confer standing). 
 168.  The Whitmore Court implicitly accepted that imminence claims require 
a certain degree of speculation; however, certain claims are too speculative. See 
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 157 (U.S. 1990) (finding, under Arkansas’ 
comparative review of death penalty sentencing, that a sentencing for a mass 
murderer was not similar enough to that of a robbery-murder to create an 
imminent injury—any injury was “too speculative”). 
 169.  See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1148–49 (2013) (finding that, because the 
plaintiffs have no “actual knowledge of the Government’s targeting practices,” 
they, at best, could “merely speculate and make assumptions about whether 
their communications” would be intercepted). Article III standing cannot rest on 
“‘mere allegations,’ but must be ‘set forth’ by affidavit or other evidence ‘specific 
facts.’” Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). The 
plaintiffs had no knowledge of the government’s practices, and therefore, they 
could not provide—nor had they provided—concrete evidence that their clients 
would be targeted. See id. at 1149 (finding that plaintiffs’ lack of knowledge 
regarding governmental discretion under the Act can only lead to speculation). 
 170.  See id. at 1149 (finding that, even if plaintiffs could prove that 
interception of their communications was imminent, they would not be able to 
trace them back to the Act, thereby failing the “fairly traceable” prong for 
Article III standing). 
 171.  See id. at 1150 (“[R]espondents can only speculate as to whether that 
court will authorize such surveillance.”); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(f)–(g) (2012) (establishing guidelines for compliance and 
certification requirements). 
 172.  See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 (2013) (noting 
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to the intercepted communications.173 Based on this speculative 
chain of events, the Court found that the plaintiffs’ injuries were 
neither certainly impending nor fairly traceable to the Act.174  
The speculative chain of events proved fatal to plaintiffs’ 
second theory for standing.175 The Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ 
argument that the Act created ongoing injuries requiring the 
plaintiffs to undertake costly mitigation measures.176 The Court 
refused to follow the Second Circuit’s “relaxed reasonableness 
standard.”177 As a result, it found that mitigation costs must stem 
from a certainly impending threat.178 Because the threat was not 
certainly impending, the mitigation costs were not a “reasonable 
reaction to a risk of harm.”179 Therefore, without a certainly 
impending threat, the mitigation costs were merely an attempt to 
“manufacture standing” rather than an actual injury.180 
Essentially, dismissal of the plaintiffs’ first argument181 
proved fatal to the second.182 The Court found that any alleged 
                                                                                                     
that the Government’s efforts to intercept plaintiffs’ communications is not 
guaranteed). 
 173.  See id. (determining that plaintiffs could only “speculate as to whether 
their own communications with their foreign contacts would incidentally be 
acquired”). 
 174.  The Court, however, acknowledged that plaintiffs can establish 
standing if there is a “substantial risk” that harm will occur. Id. at 1150 n.5 
(citing Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2754–55 (2010)). 
Plaintiffs “fall short of even that standard.” Id. 
 175.  See id. at 1151 (finding that mitigation costs not related to an imminent 
injury are insufficient to confer standing). 
 176.  See id. (denying standing because plaintiffs inflicted harm upon 
themselves without the presence of a certainly impending threat).  
 177.  See id. at 1148 (refusing to follow the Second Circuit’s “objectively 
reasonable likelihood” theory because it was too loose and, therefore, 
inconsistent with the requirement that “‘threatened injury must be certainly 
impending to constitute injury in fact.’” (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 
U.S. 149, 158 (1990))). 
 178.  See id. (finding that, because the threat was found not to be certainly 
impending, the mitigation costs were merely the result of an unwarranted fear 
of surveillance and, therefore, insufficient to confer standing). 
 179.  Id. at 1151. 
 180.  See id. (noting that, because the threat was too speculative to be 
considered certainly impending, plaintiffs’ mitigation costs were unreasonable 
and insufficient to establish standing (citing Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 
U.S. 660, 664 (1976))). 
 181.  See id. at 1146 (arguing that an injury would occur because there was 
an “objectively reasonable likelihood” that their communications would be 
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future harm relied on a speculative chain of events and concluded 
that the alleged injury was not certainly impending.183 Mitigation 
costs cannot stem from a hypothetical future harm.184 Therefore, 
the Court found that the plaintiffs used mitigation costs as a way 
to manufacture standing.185 
C. The District Courts Follow Suit 
Many district courts interpret Clapper as a large hurdle for 
data breach claims relying on imminent injury;186 others interpret 
Clapper to tighten constitutional standing altogether.187 While 
Clapper was concerned with the narrow and constitutionally 
sensitive subject of foreign surveillance under FISA, courts have 
applied it to a broad range of standing issues, including data 
breach cases.188 
                                                                                                     
intercepted in the future).  
 182.  See id. (arguing that the risk of surveillance under the Act was so 
substantial that the mitigation costs incurred to prevent it “constitute [a] 
present injury that is fairly traceable to § 1881a”). The Court concluded that 
“allowing respondents to bring th[e] action based on costs they incurred in 
response to a speculative threat would be tantamount to accepting a repackaged 
version of respondent’s first failed theory of standing.” Id. at 1151. 
 183.  See id. at 1143 (“[R]espondents’ theory of future injury is too 
speculative to satisfy the well-established requirement that threatened injury 
must be ‘certainly impending.’” (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 
(1990))). 
 184.  See id. (noting that, if standing could be based on mitigation costs 
extending from a hypothetical future harm, a plaintiff could merely purchase a 
plane ticket and have standing to sue). 
 185.  See id. (“[R]espondents cannot manufacture standing by choosing to 
make expenditures based on hypothetical future harm that is not certainly 
impending.”). 
 186.  See, e.g., In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data 
Theft Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 25 (D.D.C. 2014) (following Clapper correctly, 
finding that “there were simply too many ‘ifs’ involved before an injury came to 
pass”). 
 187.  See, e.g., Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 655 
(S.D. Ohio 2014) (discarding past data breach precedent in light of Clapper, 
essentially foreclosing any imminence claim for data breach victims). 
 188.  See infra notes 189–247 (discussing the cases that interpret Clapper as 
a virtual ban on imminent injury in data breach case law). 
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On September 3, 2013, the Northern District of Illinois, in In 
re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litigation,189 properly applying 
Clapper, denied standing where the plaintiffs suffered no actual 
injury from pin pad “skimming” at sixty three of defendant’s 
stores.190 The plaintiffs argued an increased risk of identity theft, 
resulting anxiety, emotional distress, as well as mitigation 
costs.191 The court noted the potential market for the stolen credit 
card numbers, recognizing that some could be sold for as little as 
$1.50 or as much as $90.00.192 The court found that the plaintiffs 
failed to plead concrete facts showing actual harm.193 
Interestingly, the court did not find an actual injury even where a 
plaintiff faced a reimbursed fraudulent charge; it believed that 
the only way a defendant could suffer an actual injury was 
though an “unreimbursed charge on her credit card.”194 Here, she 
only claimed loss of credit card use and it was not directly 
apparent whether any unauthorized charges were related to the 
breach.195 
The court, citing Clapper, denied the plaintiffs’ alleged 
increased risk of identity theft and mitigation cost claims.196 The 
plaintiffs could not prove that their information was actually 
stolen; therefore, the claim was more akin to increased risk of 
                                                                                                     
 189.  No. 12-CV-8617, 2013 WL 4759588 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2013). 
 190.  See id. at *2–3 (describing “skimming” as the process of reading and 
extracting temporarily stored credit card data from physical in-store pin pads 
used by customers to make payments). 
 191.  See id. at *7–12. (finding that these claims did not satisfy the certainly 
impending standard reaffirmed in Clapper). Importantly, the court noted 
Clapper’s recognition of a less rigorous standing inquiry. See Clapper v. 
Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 n.5 (2013) (“[W]e have found standing 
based on a ‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur.”).  
 192.  Barnes & Noble Pin Pad, No. 12-CV-8617, 2013 WL 4759588, at *4. 
 193.  Id. at *8 (finding that loss of credit card use was not an actual injury). 
 194.  Id. at *16 (emphasis added). 
 195.  Id. Without proving that hackers actually accessed the data, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to trace the plaintiffs’ injuries to the pin pad skimming. 
See id. at *12 (denying any actual injury because the plaintiffs did not plead the 
necessary facts to establish that their PII was stolen). 
 196.  Id. at *11–12. As we saw in Katz, plaintiffs cannot allege an increased 
risk of access; a legitimate imminence theory requires at least access to PII. See 
Katz v. Pershing, 672 F.3d 64, 80 (1st Cir. 2012) (reading the Seventh Circuit’s 
increased risk of harm theory to exclude an increased risk of access that would 
later lead to possible future harm). 
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access rather than harm.197 Accordingly, the inherent speculation 
also discredited the plaintiffs’ mitigation argument.198 The court’s 
hesitation to grant standing based on Clapper was justified; 
unlike a network breach, it is difficult to show that the plaintiff 
used the particular pin pad that was targeted. So, even if the 
plaintiffs shopped in an affected store, future harm would rely on 
proof that the particular pin pad was hacked.199 But, much to the 
chagrin of data breach victims, other district courts deny 
standing even when hackers have possession of the PII.200 
On February 10, 2014, the Southern District of Ohio in 
Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company201 interpreted 
Clapper as heightening the imminence standard for data breach 
plaintiffs. The facts are familiar: the plaintiffs gave their PII—
such as names, addresses, social security numbers—to apply for 
insurance, then the network containing this information was 
hacked.202 Defendant insurance company, which provided one 
year of free credit monitoring, instructed the plaintiffs to monitor 
their credit, and suggested they freeze their credit cards at their 
own expense.203 The plaintiffs’ PII was neither misused nor were 
their identities stolen.204 Among other claims, the plaintiffs 
                                                                                                     
 197.  See In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., No. 12-CV-8617, 2013 WL 
4759588, *12 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2013) (“Plaintiffs ‘cannot manufacture standing 
by incurring costs in anticipation of non-imminent harm.’” (citing Clapper v. 
Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1155 (2013))). It is important to note that 
the pin pad skimming must have occurred in person at the store; this was not a 
hacking of a network. Id. at *2–3. The plaintiffs did not allege that the 
particular store they shopped at was breached; they were merely “customers 
during the time when the skimming occurred.” Id. at *3. 
 198.  See id. at *11–12 (denying mitigation costs because they were not in 
response to an imminent harm). 
 199.  See id. at *2 (creating a high level of speculation because the plaintiffs’ 
argument assumed that, out of Barnes and Nobles’ 700 stores, the thieves 
“skimmed” the particular pin pad that they used). 
 200.  See infra notes 201–244 and accompanying text (discussing cases 
interpreting Clapper to essentially foreclose any imminence argument in the 
data-breach context). 
 201.  998 F. Supp. 2d 646 (S.D. Ohio, Feb. 10, 2014). 
 202.  Id. at 650.  
 203.  See id. (admitting that the plaintiffs’ information was actually stolen 
and disseminated). 
 204.  Id.  
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alleged increased risk of harm—including identity theft, identity 
fraud, or medical fraud—and associated mitigation costs.205 
The court denied standing, finding the plaintiffs’ position 
similar to that of respondents’ in Clapper and refused to follow 
Pisciotta and Krottner.206 Importantly, the court conceded that 
the hackers might have the plaintiffs’ PII in their possession; 
however, it misinterpreted Clapper, finding that all claims 
relying on third-party behavior as speculative.207 The court 
opined that any future harm was contingent on the actions of 
third parties and therefore, speculative.208 However, the Clapper 
Court was reluctant to pass judgment on actions taken by 
government actors in light of an “especially rigorous” standing 
inquiry.209 Clapper is not a complete ban on standing, especially 
when hackers have possession of plaintiffs’ PII. The only step left 
for plaintiffs to be injured is actual identity theft, credit fraud, 
etc.210 
                                                                                                     
 205.  See id. at 651 (citing Pisciotta’s standard as applicable and analogous to 
their case). 
 206.  See supra notes 84–110 and accompanying text (finding an increased 
risk of future injury or real and immediate threat of future harm sufficient to 
confer standing where laptops containing plaintiffs’ PII were stolen). 
 207.  See Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 650 (S.D. 
Ohio 2014) (“Named Plaintiffs received a letter from Defendant indicating that 
on October 23, 2012, thieves hacked into a portion of Defendant’s computer 
network and that their PII was stolen and disseminated as part of the theft.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 208.  See id. at 655 (“[T]he Supreme Court is reluctant to find standing 
where the injury-in-fact depends on the actions of independent decision-makers 
as the injury in those circumstances is speculative.” (citing Clapper v. Amnesty 
Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1141 (2013))). 
 209.  See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1141 (2013) 
(applying this heightened standard in light of separation-of-powers concerns). 
 210.  The Adobe and Remijas courts apply this very reasoning. See Remijas v. 
Neiman Marcus Grp, LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 696 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding that, once 
data thieves obtained unencrypted customer data, victims should not have to 
wait for an actual injury to occur before having standing to sue—the breach 
created a “substantial risk” of future identity theft); In re Adobe Sys. Privacy 
Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1215 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2014) (“[R]equir[ing] 
Plaintiffs to wait until they actually suffer identity theft or credit card 
fraud . . . would run counter to the well-established principle that harm need not 
have already occurred or be ‘literally certain’ in order to constitute injury-in-
fact.”). 
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Most importantly, the court did not follow circuit precedent—
Pisciotta, Krottner, and Ruiz v. Gap211—because of Clapper. The 
court stated that these cases “were decided prior to Clapper . . . . 
[Which] specifically rejected the idea that an injury is certainly 
impending if there is an ‘objectively reasonable likelihood’ it will 
occur.”212 It essentially saw the objectively reasonable likelihood 
standard as synonymous with the Ninth Circuit’s increased risk 
of future harm standard and, as such, found that Clapper 
overruled it.213 The court determined that “the increased risk of 
harm may satisfy the [Ninth Circuit’s] standards, but under 
Clapper, more is required to show an injury is certainly 
impending.”214  
In sum, the court took Clapper to reject the Ninth Circuit’s 
increased risk of future harm standard and chose to follow 
Reilly215 and several district courts.216 Because the harm was not 
imminent, the mitigation costs were based on speculation, and 
therefore, they were merely a way to “manufacture standing.”217 
However, not all courts apply Clapper with a broad brush, and 
the next case exemplifies the tension between existing data 
breach case law and Clapper’s reiteration of the certainly 
impending standard. 
                                                                                                     
 211.  380 F. App’x 689, 691 (9th Cir. 2010). For a brief discussion on Ruiz, see 
supra note 111 (finding standing where laptops containing PII were stolen). 
 212.  Galaria, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 656 (S.D. Ohio 2014).  
 213.  See id. at 654 (interpreting Clapper’s overruling of the Second Circuit’s 
“objectively reasonable likelihood” standard to foreclose any future injury that is 
not certainly impending). 
 214.  See id. at 656 (discounting Krottner’s standing requirement as too loose 
in light of Clapper). 
 215.  The court’s reliance on Reilly is improper as well. In Reilly, there was 
no indication that the plaintiffs’ information was even stolen or viewed, whereas 
here, defendants conceded that the plaintiffs’ PII was in fact stolen. See Galaria 
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 650 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (“[T]heir 
PII was stolen and disseminated as part of the theft.”). 
 216.  See id. at 657 (“[T]he Court finds persuasive the reasoning in the line of 
cases rejecting risk of harm as an injury-in-fact in the context of data 
breaches.”). 
 217.  See id. (“‘[R]espondents cannot manufacture standing merely by 
inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm 
that is not certainly impending.” (citing Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 
133 S. Ct. 1138, 1151 (2013))). 
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“[T]he import of Clapper for standing analysis in the Seventh 
Circuit . . . is a question on which reasonable minds may 
differ.”218 Relegated to a footnote, the Northern District of Illinois 
in Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc.219 not only acknowledged 
Clapper’s special circumstances, but also recognized the 
substantial risk standard.220 It did not, however, place enough 
emphasis on Clapper’s difficult constitutional context.221 The 
Strautins court dealt with a large-scale breach of South 
Carolina’s Department of Revenue; the allegations were against 
the employed data-security service—Trustwave—for an 
“imminent, immediate and continuing increased risk of identity 
theft and identity fraud.”222 The defendants announced that some 
taxpayers were potentially compromised and provided free 
services to determine if the plaintiffs in particular were 
affected.223 The plaintiff neither received notice that her data was 
compromise nor did she take advantage of the free services.224 
The court correctly dismissed for lack of standing, and it is easy 
to see why.225 However, the same conclusion could have arguably 
been reached applying Pisciotta.226 
                                                                                                     
 218.  Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 871, 878 n.11 
(N.D. Ill. 2014). As we will see, the Seventh Circuit in Remijas provides the 
answer. See infra Part IV (limiting Clapper to the narrow context of theories of 
future injury relying on the actions of independent government actors). 
 219.  27 F. Supp. 3d 871 (N.D. Ill. 2014). 
 220.  See id. at 878 n.11 (acknowledging that standing formulations vary and 
that the court has in the past applied less rigorous standards in different 
contexts). 
 221.  See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013) (“The 
law of Article III standing, which is built on separation-of-powers principles, 
serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the 
political branches.”). 
 222.  See Strautins, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 874 (noting, importantly, that South 
Carolina provided a website helping users find out if they were affected and also 
offered free credit monitoring and a lifetime of credit resolutions). 
 223.  See id. (“[T]he state set up a website and toll-free hotline for taxpayers 
to determine if their data was compromised.”). 
 224.  See id. (“Strautins admits that she . . . never used the website.”). 
 225.  South Carolina provided an online service to determine if a taxpayer’s 
specific PII was in fact compromised. Id. The plaintiffs did not use the online 
service and could not prove that their particular PII was even compromised. Id. 
 226.  The plaintiff’s entire argument relied solely on the fact that because 
she was once a taxpayer in South Carolina, then her PII must have been stolen. 
Id. at 880. The court found, however, that the breach “did not result in the 
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As a district court in the Seventh Circuit, however, the court 
found that Clapper completely overruled Pisciotta.227 The court 
felt “duty bound” to follow Clapper because both cases involved 
“potential unauthorized disclosure of sensitive personal 
information.”228 Ultimately, the court found that standing was 
not the controlling issue because Strautins “failed even to 
plausibly allege that her PII was stolen.”229 This is significant 
because the court could have left Pisciotta entirely untouched, but 
it instead it boldly asserted that Clapper overruled the 
established Seventh Circuit precedent for data breach suits.230 
Clapper’s unique set of facts should not, however, be 
construed to disqualify its application entirely. Clapper denies 
standing where future injury relies on a truly speculative chain 
were to occur.231 A highly speculative chain of events, under 
Clapper, should overcome a plaintiff’s future injury claim.232 On 
                                                                                                     
compromise of data of all taxpayers filing . . . since 1998.” Id. at 881 (emphasis 
added). Even applying the increased risk of future injury standard in Pisciotta, 
the plaintiff provided no evidence to show that she is part of the class affected 
by the breach. See id. at 874 (emphasizing that the plaintiff neither received a 
notice that her information was stolen nor did she check the South Carolina 
website). The plaintiff’s case certainly would not satisfy Katz. See supra notes 
139–144 and accompanying text (noting Katz required the plaintiff to at least 
show access to her PII). 
 227.  See Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 871, 878 
(N.D. Ill. 2014) (“Clapper seems rather plainly to reject the premise, implicit in 
Pisciotta . . . that any marginal increase in risk is sufficient to confer 
standing.”). 
 228.  Id. at 879. The Strautins court failed to consider the distinct difference 
between the two cases. See infra Part V.A.1 (urging that Clapper was not a data 
breach case and its application in the data breach context should be limited). 
 229.  See Strautins, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 879 n.11 (finding that the plaintiff 
“failed to establish even the proposition that she is at an increased risk of 
identity theft” (emphasis added)). While the court did not cite to it, this is the 
exact application of the First Circuit baseline standard. See Katz v. Pershing, 
672 F.3d 64, 80 (1st Cir. 2012) (denying standing for increased risk of access). 
 230.  See Strautins, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 879 n.11 (“[T]his Court cannot square 
[Pisciotta] with Clapper.”). The court likened the Second Circuit’s “objectively 
reasonable likelihood” standard to Pisciotta’s “increased risk of harm.” Id. 
Because Clapper explicitly declined to follow the Second Circuit standard as too 
loose, the court believed that it must have also overruled Pisciotta’s standard. 
Id. 
 231.  See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (2013) 
(“[R]espondents’ argument rests on their highly speculative fear . . . .”). 
 232.  Imminence theories relying on speculative chains of events have 
traditionally been dismissed for lack of standing; Clapper was merely following 
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May 9, 2014, the District Court for the District of Columbia in In 
re Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) Backup 
Tape Data Theft Litigation233 did just that. SAIC is an 
information technology company that handles data for the federal 
government.234 In what appeared to be a typical car theft, a SAIC 
employee’s car was broken into and the thief stole the stereo, GPS 
system, and several data tapes.235 Those data tapes, however, 
contained the PII—including medical records—of 4.7 million 
military members.236 Plaintiff military members argued that an 
increased risk of harm alone was sufficient to establish 
standing.237 The court, relying on Clapper, dismissed the cases 
because of the highly speculative chain of events required before 
any injury transpired or the data was even accessed.238 
As in Clapper, the increased risk of future identity theft was 
truly speculative. Assuming that the person who stole the tapes 
was just a run-of-the-mill car thief, he would have to: 
(1) recognize that the tapes contained computer readable PII, as 
opposed to what would be found in a typical car tape-deck; 
(2) find a data-tape reader and connect it to his computer; 
(3) download software to upload the tapes—or otherwise, slowly 
spool it through similar cassettes to obtain the data; (4) decrypt 
the portions of encrypted data; (5) acquire familiarity with the 
database format, and; (6) misuse or sell it.239 The fact that the 
tapes could either be in a landfill or fully uploaded to the thief’s 
computer was simply too speculative to constitute an increased 
threat of identity theft, let alone a certainly impending injury.240  
                                                                                                     
precedent. See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 159–60 (1990) 
(denying standing where a plaintiffs injury relied on obtaining habeas relief, a 
retrial, a reconviction, and a death sentence). 
 233.  45 F. Supp. 3d 14 (D.D.C. May 9, 2014). 
 234.  Id. at 19. The tapes contained only personal information and no credit 
card numbers. Id. at 20. 
 235.  See id. (implying that the thieves most likely stole the tapes for their 
intrinsic value rather than for their information). 
 236.  Id.  
 237.  Id. 
 238.  See id. at 25 (finding plaintiffs’ argument, that they were 9.5 times 
more likely to become victims of identity theft, unpersuasive in light of Clapper 
because Clapper requires more than an increased risk of harm). 
 239.  Id.  
 240.  See id. at 25–26 (implicitly focusing on the fact that the burglars, more 
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However, after correctly applying Clapper for speculation, 
the court interpreted Clapper to completely reject the increased 
risk theory in data breach cases.241 The court discounted pre-
Clapper sister circuit court precedent—Pisciotta, Krottner, and 
Ruiz—as “thinly reasoned.”242 As evidence, it specifically stated 
that the Strautins and Galaria courts, among others, “have been 
even more emphatic in rejecting ‘increased risk’ as a theory of 
standing in data-breach cases.”243 But, Strautins and Galaria 
applied Clapper with far too broad of a brush, failing to limit its 
application to highly speculative chains of events and government 
action.244  
D. Not so Fast, Clapper 
Other courts read Clapper for what it really was. Notably, on 
January 21, 2014, the Southern District of California in In re 
Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Security Breach 
Litigation245 found standing after a large-scale criminal intrusion 
into Sony’s online gaming network.246 The network contained 
customers’ names, email and mailing addresses, birth dates, 
credit and debit card information—including security codes, full 
numbers, and expiration dates—and login information.247 Being 
in the Ninth Circuit, the court considered Clapper’s effect on 
standing and, most importantly, Krottner’s viability. 
                                                                                                     
likely than not, did not steal the tapes for their contents). 
 241.  See id. at 25 (“That increased risk, they maintain, in and of itself 
confers standing. But as Clapper makes clear, that is not true. The degree by 
which the risk of harm has increased is irrelevant—instead, the question is 
whether the harm is certainly impending.”). 
 242.  Id. at 28. Without providing a reason, the court merely cited Pisciotta, 
Ruiz, Krottner, and Century Delta in passing, treating their reasoning as per se 
incorrect in light of Clapper. Id. 
 243.  Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 244.  See supra notes 201–230 and accompanying text (discussing how these 
courts have misinterpreted Clapper to overrule prior data breach precedent 
where the hackers had immediate access to the plaintiffs’ PII—i.e., the only step 
left was for the hacker to use the PII to the detriment of the plaintiffs). 
 245.  996 F. Supp. 2d 942 (S.D. Cal. 2014). 
 246.  See id. at 955 (conceding that millions of users’ PII was stolen). 
 247.  Id. at 954. 
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Defendants argued that Clapper tightened Krottner’s injury-
in-fact analysis.248 The court did not agree. It found no reason to 
interpret Clapper as altering, let alone tightening, constitutional 
standing requirements.249 By using the term “certainly 
impending” instead of “real and immediate,” the court opined that 
the Supreme Court did not establish a new standing 
framework.250 The court found that motions to dismiss were 
routinely denied where the plaintiff alleges the collection and 
wrongful disclosure of PII.251 Most importantly, the court found 
that Krottner and Clapper only require that plaintiffs “plausibly 
allege[] a credible threat of impending harm based on the 
disclosure of their Personal Information following the intrusion” 
to survive a motion to dismiss.252 Actual access to the plaintiffs’ 
personal information need not be alleged.253 
“Clapper did not change the law governing Article III 
standing,” said the Northern District of California later that 
same year.254 On September 4, 2014, the court in In re Adobe 
                                                                                                     
 248.  See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding 
that plaintiffs needed “a credible threat of harm” that was “both real and 
immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical” to satisfy standing for future 
harms). 
 249.  See In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Lit., 
996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 961 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (finding that the Supreme Court 
merely reiterated traditional standing requirements elicited in Whitmore). 
 250.  See id. (interpreting the “certainly impending” and the “real and 
immediate” standards as one in the same because the Supreme Court merely 
applied long established standing requirements); see also Whitmore v. 
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 160 (1990) (referring to “real and immediate” and 
“certainly impending” within the same analysis). 
 251.  See Sony Gaming Networks, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 961; see also, e.g., In re 
Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 711–12 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (finding 
standing—through a statutory violation—where defendants transmitted to 
advertisers the identities and the URL of the webpage being viewed when 
plaintiffs clicked an the advertisement); Doe 1 v. AOL, LLC, 719 F. Supp. 2d 
1102, 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding standing because there was a real and 
immediate threat that the plaintiffs’ private information would continue to be 
disclosed). 
 252.  Id. at 962. 
 253.  See id. (finding that neither Krottner nor Clapper require plaintiffs to 
allege actual access to their personal information, and that only a credible 
threat of impending harm was required to find standing).  
 254.  In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1213 (N.D. Cal. 
2014). 
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Systems Privacy Litigation255 found standing and reaffirmed 
Krottner’s viability in light of Clapper.256 As in the Sony data 
breach, the Adobe network contained customers’ email addresses, 
credit card information, bill addresses, names, telephone 
numbers, etc.257 The breach here was exactly the type of 
“sophisticated, intentional and malicious” intrusion that 
compelled the Pisciotta court to find an imminent harm of future 
injury.258 The hackers spent several weeks in the database 
without detection, decrypting and removing over 38 million 
customers’ PII.259 The plaintiffs alleged three cognizable injuries: 
“(1) increased risk of future harm; (2) costs to mitigate the risk of 
future harm; and/or (3) loss of the value of their Adobe 
products.”260 
Adobe was the first court to recognize Clapper’s sensitive 
constitutional context.261 It emphasized that Clapper merely 
overruled the Second Circuit’s “objectively reasonable likelihood” 
standard as too broad.262 It also recognized that the plaintiffs in 
Clapper could only speculate whether the governmental actors 
would even make the decision to intercept their 
communications.263 Finally, it highlighted the Supreme Court’s 
recognition of two separate and distinct standing inquiries; most 
importantly, the “substantial risk” standard.264 Given Clapper’s 
                                                                                                     
 255.  Id. 
 256.  See id. at 1214 (finding that Clapper and Krottner were not 
irreconcilable). 
 257.  Id. at 1206. 
 258.  See Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(focusing on the nature of the cyber attack). 
 259.  Adobe, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1206. 
 260.  Id. at 1211. 
 261.  See id. (emphasizing that the sensitive constitutional context in 
Clapper called for an “unusually rigorous” standing inquiry (citing Clapper v. 
Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013))). 
 262.  See id. at 1214 (“Clapper merely held that the Second Circuit had 
strayed from these well-established standing principles by accepting a too-
speculative theory of future injury.”). 
 263.  See id. at 1213 (noting that, in Clapper, the government would have to 
decide to target plaintiffs’ client’s communications, choose to invoke their 
authority under the particular challenged statute, and have an Article III judge 
decide the constitutionality of the surveillance before any action was taken). 
 264.  See id. (referring to footnote 5 of Clapper in which the Court recognized 
the existence of the “substantial risk” standard (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l 
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limited scope, the court found Krottner and Clapper 
reconcilable.265 The court placed little emphasis on Krottner’s 
alternative language, finding Krottner’s phrasing more similar to 
Clapper’s “certainly impending” than to the Second Circuit’s 
“objectively reasonably likelihood.”266 As such, the court found 
standing under Krottner.267 
Interestingly, the court not only reaffirmed Krottner’s 
viability, but it also found standing under Clapper as well.268 In 
its opinion, the plaintiffs’ risk of their PII being misused was 
“immediate and very real.”269 The court focused on the fact that 
the hackers deliberately targeted Adobe’s servers, spent several 
weeks collecting customer PII, and that the plaintiffs’ PII was in 
fact taken during the breach.270 There was no speculation 
whether the information was taken.271 In the courts eyes, the 
injury could only be more imminent if their PII had already been 
misused.272 The court did not believe that plaintiffs should have 
to “wait until they actually suffer identity theft . . . to establish 
                                                                                                     
USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 n.5 (2013))). The court interpreted the substantial 
risk standard to permit plaintiffs to reasonably incur mitigation costs if there is 
a substantial risk of harm. Id. at 1213. 
 265.  See id. at 1214 (finding that lower courts in the Ninth Circuit have a 
duty to reconcile “intervening higher authority” with Ninth Circuit precedent 
unless higher authority clearly overrules it).  
 266.  Compare Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 
2010) (“[I]mmediate danger of sustaining some direct injury . . . . [C]redible 
threat of real and immediate harm . . . .”), with Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 
133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (“[C]ertainly impending . . . .”). Importantly, the 
court failed to notice that Krottner’s “real and immediate” threat test came from 
the very case that established the certainly impending requirement. See 
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 160 (1990) (“[T]here is no amount of 
evidence that potentially could establish that Whitmore's asserted future injury 
is ‘real and immediate.’” (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974))). 
This further supports that Krottner’s standard not only is viable, but that it also 
works hand in hand with the certainly impending standard. 
 267.  See In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1211–12 (N.D. 
Cal. 2014) (“Adobe does not dispute that Krottner is directly on point.”). 
 268.  See id. at 1214 (“[E]ven if Krottner is no longer good law, the threatened 
harm alleged here is sufficiently concrete and imminent to satisfy Clapper.”). 
 269.  Id. at 1215. 
 270.  See id. (expressing the same concern seen in the Pisciotta court with 
regard to the nature of the cyber attack). 
 271.  See id. (recognizing that Adobe notified its customers that their 
particular PII was accessed). 
 272.  Id. 
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standing.”273 The Seventh Circuit found this reasoning 
persuasive.274 
IV. The Seventh Circuit Answers the Call 
As we have seen, even with similar facts, the circuit courts 
addressed the imminent injury issue extremely differently.275 
After Clapper—a non-data breach case—several district courts 
determined that Clapper not only overruled circuit court data 
breach precedent,276 but that it tightened the imminent injury 
standard altogether.277 Then came Remijas v. Neiman Marcus 
Group, LLC278 on July 20, 2015, boldly stating: “Clapper does 
not . . . foreclose any use whatsoever of future injuries to support 
Article III standing.”279 This makes the Seventh Circuit the first 
                                                                                                     
 273.  See id. (refusing to wait for an actual injury because it would run 
contrary to the established principle that harm need not be “literally certain” 
(citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 n.5 (2013))). 
 274.  See infra Part IV (discussing the Remijas court’s application of Adobe’s 
reasoning). 
 275.  See supra Part III.A (comparing the differences in circuit courts’ 
treatment of data breach claims).  
 276. See Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(increased risk of future harm); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 
1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (credible threat of real and immediate injury). 
 277.  See, e.g., Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 871, 876 
(N.D. Ill. 2014) (“Clapper compels rejection of Strautins' claim that an increased 
risk of identity theft is sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for 
standing.”); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d. 646 (S.D. Ohio 
2014) (holding that the increased risk of future harm relying on the occurrence 
of future criminal actions by independent decision-makers was not imminent or 
certainly impending); In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., No. 12-CV-8617, 
2013 WL 4759588, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2013) (“The Complaint alleges 
Plaintiffs incurred expenses to mitigate an increased risk of identity theft or 
fraud, but it does not allege what those expenses are with any specificity. Even 
if specific expenses had been alleged, such expenses would not qualify as actual 
injuries under Clapper.” (emphasis added)). 
 278.  See Seventh Circuit Denies En Banc Review For Data Breach Class 
Action, HUNTON & WILLIAMS PRIV. BLOG (Sept. 29, 2015), 
https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2015/09/29/seventh-circuit-denies-en-banc-
review-for-data-breach-class-action/ (last visited May 12, 2016) (discussing the 
denial of en banc review for Remijas) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 279.  Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC., 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 
2015). 
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post-Clapper circuit court to consider imminent injury in the data 
breach context.280  
In Remijas, Neiman Marcus sent letters to its customers 
disclosing that a data breach exposed potentially 350,000 
customer credit cards.281 Importantly, Neiman Marcus offered all 
350,000 customers credit monitoring and identity-theft 
protection.282 The plaintiffs alleged two imminent injuries: “an 
increased risk of future fraudulent charges and greater 
susceptibility to identity theft.”283 The court found that those 
plaintiffs claiming actual identity theft alleged a cognizable 
injury-in-fact.284 
“At this stage in the litigation, it is plausible to infer that the 
plaintiffs have shown a substantial risk of harm from the Neiman 
Marcus data breach.”285 Importantly, the court distinguished the 
case from Clapper because here, Neiman Marcus confirmed the 
breach,286 whereas in Clapper, the plaintiffs only suspected that 
                                                                                                     
 280.  Its decision caused a ripple effect in the district courts. See Antman v. 
Uber Techs., Inc., No. 3:15-CV-01175-LB, 2015 WL 6123054, at *10 (N.D. Cal. 
Oct. 19, 2015) (citing Remijas and Adobe in confirming the continuing viability 
of Krottner’s “credible, real, and immediate” future injury test). The court 
applied Adobe and Remijas’ reasoning to limit Clapper. Id.; see also In re 
SuperValu, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2592, *15 (D. Minn. Jan. 7, 2016) 
(distinguishing Remijas and Adobe, arguing that they apply only where there is 
clear access and misuse to the PII); Whalen v. Michael Stores Inc., No. 14-CV-
7006 (JS)(ARL), 2015 WL 9462108, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2015) (“But one 
critical distinction in [Remijas] is that 9,200 of those customers experienced 
fraudulent charges following the breach.”); Conrad v. Boiron, Inc., 2015 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 152981 (“There must be at least a substantial risk of future harm 
to the named plaintiff.” (citing Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693));  
 281.  See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 690 (noting that “9,200 of those 350,000 
exposed credit cards” were already used fraudulently). 
 282.  Id. Ironically, offering this protection hurt the defendant’s case because 
the court reasoned that they would not have provided credit monitoring if the 
risk was “so ephemeral that it [could] safely be disregarded.” Id. at 694. 
 283.  Id. at 692. 
 284.  See id. (conferring standing even though those plaintiffs actually 
injured had been reimbursed, finding that with identity theft comes lost time 
and additional expenses to pursue relief and “sort things out”). 
 285.  Id. at 693 (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 
n.5 (2013) (acknowledging the “substantial risk of harm” standard and implying 
that it is a lesser standard than “certainly impending”). 
 286.  See id. at 694 (“Neiman Marcus does not contest the fact that the initial 
breach took place.”). 
CLAPPER DETHRONED 101 
their communications would be intercepted.287 In Remijas, there 
was no doubt that the information was stolen and its contents 
were clear.288 As such, the court found that future injury was 
imminent.289 Second, with regard to traceability, it acknowledged 
an issue particularly relevant to any data breach plaintiff’s claim 
of future harm;290 the longer a plaintiff “wait[s] for the threatened 
harm to materialize,” the stronger a defendant’s traceability 
defense becomes.291 Nor did defendant’s argument—that any 
alleged future injuries may arise from other breaches—convince 
the court that the claim was not fairly traceable to Neiman 
Marcus.292 
Third, the court acknowledged the obvious reality inherent in 
any targeted data breach.293 All along, courts should have been 
asking the question—as the Remijas court wisely did—“Why else 
would hackers break into a store’s database and steal consumers’ 
private information . . . . [If not] to [eventually] make fraudulent 
                                                                                                     
 287.  See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (2013) 
(“[R]espondents’ theory necessarily rests on their assertion that the Government 
will target other individuals—namely, their foreign contacts. Yet respondents 
have no actual knowledge of the Government’s §1881a targeting practices.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 288. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC., 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 
2015) (conceding that 350,000 credit cards were potentially exposed). 
 289. The nature of the attack, the access to PII, and the free credit 
monitoring all persuaded the court that there was a substantial risk of future 
harm and that the mitigation costs were, therefore, in response to an imminent 
harm. Id. at 694. 
 290.  Recall that an injury must “be fairly traceable to the challenged action 
of the defendant.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
 291.  See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693 (citing In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 
F. Supp. 3d. 1197, 1215 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 2014)). This directly challenges Reilly’s 
theory that victims of data breach should sue once the injury materializes. See 
Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 45 (3d Cir. 2011) (“In a data breach 
case . . . there is no reason to believe that monetary compensation will not 
return plaintiffs to their original position completely—if the hacked information 
is actually read, copied, understood, and misused to a plaintiff's detriment.”). 
 292.  See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 696 (likening the defendant’s argument to 
that of Summers v. Tice, in which the court shifted the burden upon the 
defendants prove who was responsible (citing Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 88 
(1944))). 
 293.  As compared to what appeared to be a typical car burglary in SAIC. See 
supra notes 231–244 (discussing the SAIC court’s correct application of 
Clapper). 
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charges or assume those consumers’ identity[?]”294Guided by the 
obvious answer, the court found the plaintiffs’ substantial risk of 
harm plausible.295 
Finally, with regard to mitigation costs incurred, the court’s 
answer once again appears to follow common sense. The court 
reasoned that, once a consumer hears that her credit card was 
stolen, purchasing credit protection is not an unreasonable 
response.296 Also, the price of credit protection, such as Experian, 
is around $19.95 per month after the first month; a cost the court 
calls “more than de minimis.”297 The court found that mitigation 
expenses were a valid actual injury in response to the substantial 
risk of harm.298  
V. In Light of Remijas, Courts Should Confer Standing for 
Victims of Targeted Data Breaches 
This Note does not argue that any loss of data creates an 
imminent injury. Rather, it only argues that Clapper did not 
change preexisting standing requirements and that it has been 
incorrectly interpreted to deny standing for otherwise legitimate 
claims. Clapper left the circuit court data breach opinions—
Pisciotta and Krottner—intact because they permit an allowable 
level of speculation inherent in any imminent injury claim. To 
determine Clapper’s proper application, we must consider the 
level of speculation involved;299 the circumstances surrounding a 
                                                                                                     
 294.  Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC., 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 
2015). 
 295.  See id. (referring to additional government data showing that hackers 
may wait up to a year before using the information illegally or that the 
information may be sold or posted on the Internet, leaving open the possibility 
that fraudulent use of the information could last for years). 
 296.  Especially in light of the fact that Neiman Marcus offered to provide 
free credit protection to anyone who shopped in their stores in between January 
2013 and January 2014. Id. at 694. 
 297.  Id. 
 298.  See id. (analogizing to the First Circuit in Anderson v. Hannaford Bros. 
Co., in which the court found standing where the “plaintiffs sufficiently alleged 
mitigation expenses—namely, the fees for replacement cards and monitoring 
expenses . . . [even though] the harm [was] not physical”). 
 299.  See infra Part V.B (discussing the speculation inherent in all imminent 
injury claims and limiting Clapper’s application to true speculation). 
CLAPPER DETHRONED 103 
data breach;300 and the applicable standing inquiry.301 These 
elements are critical to Clapper’s proper application. 
A. The “Certainly Impending” Standard Remains Unchanged 
Recall that Clapper was a government surveillance case that 
reaffirmed the “well-established requirement that a future injury 
must be ‘certainly impending.’”302 In reality, the import of the 
Court’s decision is very narrow. First, the Court found the Second 
Circuit’s loose and “novel” “objectively reasonable likelihood” 
standard inconsistent with the certainly impending standard.”303 
It did not purport to heighten the standing inquiry nor did it 
discard the substantial risk standard.304 Second, it found that 
plaintiffs cannot establish standing based on costs incurred 
mitigating highly speculative future harm—i.e. “manufactur[ing] 
standing.”305 Third, it reaffirmed that heightened judicial 
scrutiny applies where courts are forced to speculate into the 
hypothetical actions of independent government actors.306 
1. Clapper is a Scalpel, Not a Wrecking Ball 
The proposition that, “under Clapper, more is required to 
show an injury is certainly impending”307 is patently incorrect.308 
                                                                                                     
 300.  See infra Part V.A (distinguishing between malicious targeted cyber 
attacks directed towards data servers and coincidental data thefts). 
 301.  See infra Part V.C (discussing whether to apply the “certainly 
impending” or “substantial risk” standards in determining imminence). 
 302.  Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013). 
 303.  See id. (invalidating the Second Circuit’s “novel view of standing”). 
 304.  See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 
2015) (“[Clapper] did not jettison the ‘substantial risk’ standard.” (internal 
citation omitted)); In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1213 
(N.D. Cal. 2014) (“The Supreme Court did not overrule any precedent, nor did it 
reformulate the familiar standing requirements of injury-in-fact, causation, and 
redressability.”). 
 305.  See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1143 (finding that incurring mitigation costs 
based on a non-imminent harm would permit plaintiffs to essentially purchase 
their way into court). 
 306.  Id. at 1141. 
 307.  See Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 656 (S.D. 
Ohio 2014) (interpreting Clapper as heightening standing altogether). 
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In Clapper, the Court did not heighten the certainly impending 
standard; it was simply not met.309 The alleged harm failed to 
satisfy even the less stringent substantial risk standard.310 If it 
could not satisfy this lesser standard, it follows that the certainly 
impending inquiry would fail as well—let alone an allegedly 
heightened standard.311 Therefore, there would be no reason for 
the Court to raise the standard if the baseline was not even 
satisfied. It logically follows that the standard was not raised; 
rather, it simply was not met because of the high degree of 
speculation.312 Therefore, if the certainly impending standard has 
been heightened, its application must be limited to future harm 
contingent on speculative decisions of independent government 
actors.313 
Furthermore, Clapper was not a data breach case. The Court 
neither discussed data breach case law nor did it question 
Krottner’s standard.314 Clapper merely concluded that the Second 
Circuit’s “objectively reasonably likelihood” standard deviated 
                                                                                                     
 308.  Clapper could not have purported to heighten the standard because the 
chain of events did not even satisfy the substantial risk standard. It was truly 
speculative regardless of the standard applied.  
 309.  See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013) (finding 
the plaintiffs argument too speculative). 
 310. See id. at 1150 n.5 (“But to the extent that the ‘substantial risk’ 
standard is relevant and is distinct from the ‘certainly impending’ requirement, 
respondents fall short of even that standard, in light of the attenuated chain of 
inferences necessary to find harm here.”). 
 311.  See id. (implying that the substantial risk of future harm standard is 
less demanding than the certainly impending standard). 
 312.  The speculation coupled with the Court’s separation-of-powers concern 
left the plaintiffs’ case doomed from the start. See id. at 1144–45 (recognizing 
that the plaintiffs’ case presented a constitutional challenge to a government 
surveillance statute “subject to congressional oversight and several types of 
Executive Branch review”). 
 313.   In this scenario, prior circuit court precedent must co-exist with 
Clapper. See, e.g., Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (“We hold 
that the issues decided by the higher court need not be identical in order to be 
controlling. Rather, the relevant court of last resort must have undercut the 
theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that 
the cases are clearly irreconcilable.”). 
 314.  See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 
2010) (finding standing because the court found that the plaintiffs were in 
“immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury,” alleging a “credible threat 
of real and immediate harm”). 
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from traditional standing law.315 Regardless, Krottner’s standard 
is more closely worded to Clapper’s “certainly impending” 
standard than the “objectively reasonable likelihood” standard.316 
As the Adobe court found, this similarity, coupled with Clapper’s 
lack of intent to alter standing law, reaffirmed Krottner’s 
viability.317  
2. Speculation and Third-Party Action 
Clapper reaffirms the established principle that too much 
speculation sounds the death knell for any imminence claim.318 
Clapper does not stand for the proposition that any speculation 
effectively topples a certainly impending imminent injury 
claim.319 Once a hacker has unfettered access to PII, a future 
injury is not highly speculative; injury is the final step.320 
Speculation is inherent in any theory of imminent injury.321 The 
                                                                                                     
 315.  See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (finding 
the Second Circuit’s imminence standard too loose to satisfy the traditional 
certainly impending standard). 
 316.  See In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1214 (N.D. 
Cal. 2014) (determining that a slight change in Krottner’s word usage did not 
create a test separate and distinct from Clapper’s certainly impending 
standard). This is likely because “real and immediate” and “certainly 
impending” both came from the same case. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 
154–60 (1990). 
 317.  See id. (considering Krottner’s different word usage as insubstantial, 
arguing that its standard was more in line with Clapper). 
 318.  See Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 157 (acknowledging that imminent injury 
cases require certain at least some speculation). 
 319.  Or for that matter, a claim relying on a substantial risk of future harm. 
 320.  See Adobe, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1215 (“[T]he threatened injury here could 
be more imminent only if Plaintiffs could allege that their stolen personal 
information had already been misused.”). But see Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. 
Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 650 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (discrediting the plaintiffs 
imminence theory as speculative in light of Clapper even after hackers accessed 
the plaintiffs data). 
 321.  This is not a novel position and is readily accepted in non-data breach 
case law. For example, in cases involving exposure to toxic substances, there is 
speculation whether the harm will materialize and to what degree. See Denney 
v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 264–65 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting, in dicta, that 
exposure to toxic substances could establish a risk of future harm sufficient to 
constitute an injury-in-fact). In medical malpractice suits, the harm has either 
already occurred or it is imminent. While a botched procedure may statistically 
lead to problems in the future, it is never certain until it materializes. See 
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Clapper Court expressly stated that future harm is not required 
to be “literally certain.”322 Conversely, this suggests that standing 
permits a certain degree of speculation. 
Concededly, the Clapper plaintiffs’ alleged future injury was 
speculative regardless of the standard applied.323 This is a far cry 
from the common scenario where the only remaining step is to 
use a consumer’s PII fraudulently.324 Speculation is minimal 
where hackers have unfettered access to stolen PII, especially 
after a sophisticated attack.325 The Galaria court, for example, 
incorrectly considered future harm relying on any third-party 
action as speculative.326 Citing Clapper, the Galaria court denied 
standing because the plaintiffs’ theory relied on “the actions of 
independent decision makers.”327 Clapper’s import, with regard to 
independent actors, is far more limited.328 The Clapper Court 
applied this reasoning to the government context because of the 
                                                                                                     
Sutton v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 568, 574–75 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding 
that a defective medical implant creates a increased risk of future harm 
sufficient to establish a cognizable injury).  
 322.  See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 n.5 (2013) 
(implying that both the certainly impending and the substantial risk of future 
harm standards allow for certain degrees of speculation). 
 323.  Recall that the plaintiffs’ clients would need to be selected for targeting, 
they would need to be targeted under the particular statute in question, the 
Foreign International Surveillance Court would need to authorize the 
surveillance, and the surveillance would need to be successful. Clapper, 133 S. 
Ct. at 1148. 
 324.  See In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1215 (N.D. 
Cal. 2014) (recognizing that the minimal speculation required once the data is 
stolen). 
 325.  See infra Part V.B.1 (discussing the particularly high risk of harm 
resulting from an organized infiltration of a data network). 
 326.  See Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 655 (S.D. 
Ohio 2014) (interpreting Clapper to deny standing where future harm relied on 
actions by any independent parties, failing to recognize Clapper’s rigorous 
standing inquiry in the context of independent governmental decision makers). 
 327.  See id. (taking Clapper’s emphasis on independent decision makers out 
of context (citing Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1141))). According to the court, any 
alleged injury is “contingent on what, if anything . . . third party criminals do 
with th[e] information.” Id. 
 328.  See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1144–45 (2013) 
(noting that § 1881a was subject to congressional and Executive Branch review, 
and subject to Fourth Amendment limitations where independent judges 
determined the constitutionality of any proposed foreign surveillance). 
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separation-of-powers concern.329 It was not intended to foreclose 
any future harm contingent on the actions of non-governmental 
third parties.330  
B. The Nature of Data Breach and Ease of Access to Stolen 
Information 
The circumstances surrounding a breach are particularly 
relevant in determining whether Clapper applies and the nature 
of the speculation involved.331 As we have seen, one can hardly 
call a car burglary a “data breach” merely because a data tape 
happened to be stolen along with other valuable electronic 
equipment.332 A targeted attack on a corporation’s data server, 
however, is another story. The theft of a laptop containing 
unencrypted PII requires its own and different considerations. If 
the criminal does not intend to steal data but a physical theft 
results in unfettered access, this raises a future injury towards 
certainly impending.333 As such, the nature of the breach and the 
                                                                                                     
 329.  When the Court claimed its traditional reluctance to speculate into the 
actions of independent decision makers, it cited Whitmore and Lujan, both 
requiring speculation into the actions of governmental actors. See Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992) (“When the suit is one 
challenging the legality of government action or inaction . . . .” (emphasis 
added)); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 159–60 (1990) (“It is just not 
possible for a litigant to prove in advance that the judicial system will lead to 
any particular result in his case.” (emphasis added)). 
 330.  See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency 
Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S.669, 678 (1973) (granting standing where 
plaintiffs alleged that imminent “economic, recreational and aesthetic harm” 
would result from the Interstate Commerce Commission’s approval of a railroad 
surcharge). The Court further found the alleged harms, even if incorrect, 
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss because they may be able to show that 
the “string of occurrences alleged would happen immediately.” Id. at 159. 
 331.  See infra notes 332–358 and accompanying text (arguing that 
unfettered access to PII, regardless of the thief’s intent, creates a sufficiently 
imminent injury). 
 332.  See In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft 
Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 25 (D.D.C. 2014) (“The tapes could be uploaded onto 
her computer and fully deciphered, or they could be lying in a landfill 
somewhere in Texas because she trashed them after achieving her main goal of 
boosting the car stereo and GPS.”). 
 333.  See, e.g., Riley, supra note 12 (noting that credit card information can 
be sold on the internet for around $3.50 per number). Note that, even if the thief 
does not have access to the “deep web” market for credit card numbers, he has 
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ease of access to PII are particularly relevant considerations 
when determining imminence.334 
1. The Sophisticated Attack 
Some cases conferring standing emphasized the hackers’ 
specific targeting methods and sophistication when determining 
imminence.335 The Pisciotta court emphasized the breach’s 
“sophisticated, intentional and malicious” nature;336 Adobe and 
Remijas followed suit.337 Recognizing the sophisticated and 
calculated nature of a breach is critical to whether an injury is 
imminent, but some courts ignore it altogether.338 Rather, they 
deny standing even where a defendant concedes that hackers 
                                                                                                     
all the information necessary to make fraudulent charges. See Pierluigi 
Paganini, Buying Personal Information in the Deep Web, INFOSEC INST. (Mar. 
24, 2015), http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/buying-personal-information-in-
the-deep-web/ (last visited May 12, 2016) (“The term underground ecosystem is 
usually used to refer a collection of forums, websites and chat rooms that are 
designed with the specific intent to advantage, streamline and industrialize 
criminal activities.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 334.  See infra Parts V.B.1–2 (differentiating between sophisticated cyber 
attacks and physical theft of electronics containing PII, but ultimately 
concluding that both instances present an imminent injury where nothing more 
is required to access the data). 
 335.  Compare Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 631–32 (7th Cir. 
2007) (granting standing after a sophisticated and malicious attack on a data 
server without considering whether or not the hackers copied or disseminated 
the data), In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1206 (N.D. Cal. 
2014) (granting standing after hackers breached Adobe’s data network, spent 
weeks inside, and removed customer data, all without detection), and Remijas v. 
Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir. 2015) (granting standing 
where hackers potentially gained access to 350,000 consumers’ credit card 
information), with Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1140 (9th Cir. 
2010) (granting standing after a laptop containing the unencrypted PII of 
thousands of employees was stolen), and Ruiz v. Gap, 380 F. App’x 689, 690 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (granting standing after a laptop containing 750,000 unencrypted 
employment applications was stolen). 
 336. Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 632. 
 337. See Adobe, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1214 ([T]he hackers deliberately targeted 
Adobe's servers and spent several weeks collecting names . . . .”); Remijas, 794 
F.3d at 693 (“[T]he hackers deliberately targeted Neiman Marcus in order to 
obtain their credit-card information . . . .”). 
 338.  See supra Parts III.A,C (arguing that Clapper has blinded the courts to 
the obvious imminence of future harm after a sophisticated cyber attack). 
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possess the plaintiffs PII after a cyber attack.339 Other courts 
concede that hackers infiltrated a data system, but refused to 
recognize they could have actually saved or read customer PII.340  
Hackers, by virtue of their “profession,” possess a specific set 
of skills unknown to the layperson.341 Hacking into a data 
network, presumably, is done for a specific purpose—to access the 
data behind the encryption software.342 Once this data is accessed 
and seen by unauthorized eyes, the damage is done—the hackers 
have all the information necessary to harm the plaintiffs.343 The 
Adobe court found that once data is accessed, the only step left for 
a harm to occur is the harm itself.344 Additionally, Remijas noted 
that the longer a plaintiff waits to sue, the harder it is to prove 
                                                                                                     
 339.  See supra Parts III.A,C (discussing the Strautins and Galaria courts’ 
lack of legitimate consideration of the circumstances surrounding a cyber 
attack). 
 340.  See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 40 (3d Cir. 2011) (“An 
unknown hacker infiltrated Ceridian’s Powerpay system and potentially gained 
access to personal and financial information . . . . It is not known whether the 
hacker read, copied, or understood the data.” (emphasis added)). 
 341.  See The Essential Skills to Becoming a Hacker, WONDERHOWTO: NULL-
BYTE (2015), http://null-byte.wonderhowto.com/how-to/essential-skills-becoming-
master-hacker-0154509/ (last visited May 12, 2016) (“As the hacker is among 
the most skilled information technology disciplines, it requires a wide 
knowledge of IT technologies and techniques.”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 342.  Given the complex set of skills that hacking requires and the degree of 
criminal liability involved, hackers capable of breaching a corporate data 
network presumably do not do so without intending to see the encrypted 
information. See 10 Ways Companies Get Hacked, CNBC (Apr. 14, 2015), 
http://www.cnbc.com/2012/07/06/10-Ways-Companies-Get-Hacked.html (last 
visited May 12, 2016) (identifying sophisticated methods that hackers use to 
gain entry into corporate data networks) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 343.  We have seen various types of damaging PII stolen throughout this 
discussion. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th 
Cir. 2015) (credit card information); In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 
3d 1197, 1215 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (same); In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., No. 
12-CV-8617, 2013 WL 4759588, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2013) (same); see also In 
re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F. 
Supp. 3d 14, 25 (D.D.C. 2014) (names, addresses, contact information, medical 
records); Reilly, 664 F.3d at 40 (personal and financial information); Galaria v. 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d. 646, 650 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (financial 
information, including social security numbers). 
 344.  Adobe, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1215 (conferring standing even though any 
identity theft relied on actions by third parties). 
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traceability.345 In its justification, the Remijas court pointed to 
evidence showing that victims of data breach remain exposed for 
many years.346 This could lead to identity theft long after free 
credit monitoring expires, leaving plaintiffs without a remedy in 
court.347 In this light, the conclusion that harm is speculative 
after a sophisticated and intentional data breach appears bizarre 
to say the least. Yet, some courts interpret Clapper to require 
such a result.348 
2. The Average Thief’s Windfall 
A burglar breaks into a house and among the items he steals 
is what appears to be an ordinary laptop. But what happens 
when the laptop contains the unencrypted credit card numbers 
and personal information of tens of thousands of people? 
Admittedly, future harm from theft of an encrypted laptop or 
data tape requires highly speculative steps.349 Unlike a 
sophisticated cyber attack, the average thief does not have the 
skills to decrypt a laptop or read—or even recognize the 
significance of—a data tape.350 However, on a decrypted laptop, a 
hacker’s ease of access to the data is readily apparent, and the 
                                                                                                     
 345.  Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693 (bolstering its traceability analysis with the 
fact that Neiman Marcus already raised it as a defense). 
 346.  See id. at 694 (“[S]tolen data may be held for up to a year or more 
before being used to commit identity theft. Further, once stolen data have been 
sold or posted on the Web, fraudulent use of that information may continue for 
years.”). 
 347.  See id. (noting that plaintiffs are left vulnerable to attack for several 
years and that it becomes increasingly difficult to trace any damages to the 
defendant, especially given the increasing frequency of data breaches). 
 348.  See supra Part III.C (discussing cases that denied standing where 
hackers gained access to the particular plaintiffs PII after a sophisticated 
breach). 
 349.  Certain levels of speculation are inherent and permitted in any 
imminence claim. See supra note 330 (discussing SCRAP—a case cited by 
Whitmore when it established the certainly impending standard—where the 
court granted standing because the plaintiffs could possibly prove the 
immediacy of the alleged injury during trial). 
 350.  See In re Sci. Applications Int'l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft 
Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 25 (D.D.C. 2014) (denying standing based on the 
speculative chain of events required to actually read the information on the 
stolen data tapes). 
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harm is real and immediate.351 As we have seen, with successful 
and deliberate targeting comes ease of access to data and the only 
remaining step is injury.352 This same immediacy is present were 
thief has the valuable PII at his fingertips.353 There is no 
speculation whether he will recognize the information for what it 
is or that special means must be used to access it.354  
C. Reconciling Competing Circuit Standards in Light of a Limited 
Clapper 
With Clapper properly limited, data breach victims can 
establish standing under two theories: (1) the certainly 
impending or (2) the substantial risk standards.355 In this 
discussion, many theories for standing have come to light from 
different circuits.356 Pisciotta was the first circuit to tackle the 
issue.357 Analogizing to toxic tort, medical malpractice, and 
environmental cases, the court found that an increased risk of 
                                                                                                     
 351.  See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(“Here, Plaintiffs-Appellants have alleged a credible threat of real and 
immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop containing their 
unencrypted personal data.”); Ruiz v. Gap, 380 F. App’x 689, 691 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(granting standing under Century Delta’s “credible threat of harm” standard 
(citing Cent. Delta Agency Water Agency, 306 F.3d 938, 950 (9th Cir. 2002))); 
Enslin v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 2:14-CV-06476, 2015 WL 5729241, at *14 (E.D. Pa. 
Sept. 30, 2015) (granting standing where plaintiffs suffered actual injuries 
stemming from laptop theft). 
 352.  The Sony, Adobe and Remijas courts do not ignore the obvious 
implications of a sophisticated data breach. See supra notes 245–298 (conferring 
standing where data was accessed after a sophisticated breach). 
 353.  See Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1143 (conferring standing where a thief had 
unfettered access to PII). 
 354.  Note in SAIC, the court denied standing because to the average person, 
data tapes are not readily recognizable. SAIC, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 25. This is 
clearly distinguishable from an unencrypted list of PII. 
 355.  See In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1215 (N.D. 
Cal. 2014) (finding that the plaintiffs satisfied both Krottner and the certainly 
impending standard);  
 356.  See supra Part III (discussing the standards applied in Clapper, 
Pisciotta, and Krottner, and how courts have interpreted them). 
 357.  See Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(citing to sister circuit courts in an attempt to analogize toxic tort, medical 
malpractice, and environmental harm cases to data breach lawsuits). 
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harm was sufficient to confer standing.358 As noted, speculation is 
inherent in any imminent injury claim.359 We have seen that 
Clapper, properly limited, only forecloses standing theories 
relying on a “highly speculative” and “highly attenuated” chain of 
events.360 Therefore, where PII is readily accessible to hackers or 
identity thieves, the only step remaining is for the harm to 
occur.361 It follows that, even if Pisciotta’s standard is more 
similar to an “objectively reasonable likelihood,” a substantial 
risk of harm still existed and, most likely, the harm was certainly 
impending.362 
Krottner, following Pisciotta, found standing where the 
plaintiffs faced “a credible threat of harm that was both real and 
immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical.”363 Krottner reached 
this conclusion through similar analogies to other non-data 
breach cases cited in Pisciotta.364 The standard, however, is more 
akin to the traditional “certainly impending standard.”365 
Krottner, while reiterating that an imminent harm exists, set the 
appropriate standard slightly above Pisciotta. This was not a 
mere increased risk of harm, rather, the harm was “real and 
immediate.”366  
                                                                                                     
 358.  For cases discussing personal injury, see Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 
443 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 2006); Sutton v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 568 (6th 
Cir. 2005). For cases discussing environmental harm, see Cent. Delta Water 
Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2002); Friends of the Earth, Inc. 
v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 359.  See supra Part V.A.2 (discussing allowable levels of speculation in 
imminence claims). 
 360.  See supra Part V.A.2 (conceding that Clapper was rightfully decided 
given the speculative nature of plaintiffs alleged future injuries). 
 361.  See supra Part V.A.2 (noting that Clapper only rejects imminence 
theories that require speculation into the actions of independent governmental 
actors).  
 362.  As seen in Adobe—which was decided on similar facts—the court found 
that the plaintiffs satisfied the certainly impending requirement. In re Adobe 
Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1214 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 363.  Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 364.  See cases cited supra note 330 (listing toxic tort, medical malpractice, 
and environmental cases all granting standing for an increased risk of future 
harm). 
 365.  See supra notes 305–307 (likening Krottner’s standard to be more 
similar to “certainly impending” than an “objectively reasonable likelihood”). 
 366.  The court noted that, had the plaintiffs alleged future harm from a 
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As an aside, it is important to address Reilly’s criticism of 
Pisciotta and Krottner’s analogy to toxic tort, medical malpractice, 
and environmental cases.367 Reilly appears to stand for the 
proposition that, if future identity theft can only be articulated 
using the word “if,” it is not imminent.368 But such a reading 
leaves no effective method of redressing harms stemming from 
data breaches. The court found that, as opposed to someone’s 
health or the destruction of a wilderness habitat, the only thing 
at stake was money.369 Because monetary damages are 
quantifiable at the time of the actual harm, the court argued that 
suit should be brought once the injury occurs.370 Given that injury 
can occur over one year after a breach371 coupled with the high 
frequency of data breaches,372 it would be increasingly difficult to 
prove traceability.373  
The Adobe court found that harm is certainly impending 
where hackers have access to PII.374 In fact, the only way an 
                                                                                                     
future theft of the laptop, then the threat would be “far less credible.” Krottner, 
628 F.3d at 1143. 
 367.  See supra notes 127–135 (discussing Reilly’s reliance on the policies 
surrounding toxic torts, medical malpractice, and environmental suits and how 
the court found them inapplicable in the data breach context). 
 368.  See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 43 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[W]e 
cannot now describe how Appellants will be injured in this case without 
beginning our explanation with the word ‘if’ . . . .”). 
 369.  Id. at 45–46. 
 370.  See id. at 45 (“In a data breach case, however, there is no reason to 
believe that monetary compensation will not return plaintiffs to their original 
position completely . . . .”). 
 371. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir. 
2015) (“[S]tolen data may be held for up to a year or more before being used to 
commit identity theft. Further, once stolen data have been sold or posted on the 
Web, fraudulent use of that information may continue for years."). 
 372.  See Chen, supra note 10 (discussing the rise in identity theft, reporting 
that in 2014, there were over 250,000 successful identity thefts in America 
alone). 
 373.  Remijas, 794 F.3d at 694 (citing In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. 
Supp. 3d 1197, 1215 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 2014)). In Adobe, the defendant used the 
very argument that, as time goes on without injury, it is more and more unlikely 
that any future injury was defendants fault. In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 
F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1215 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 2014).  
 374.  See Adobe, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1215 (finding Clapper inapplicable because 
there was no speculation whether the information was stolen); Remijas, 794 
F.3d at 696 (finding that, once data thieves obtained unencrypted customer 
data, victims should not have to wait for an actual injury to occur before having 
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injury could be more imminent was if the data was already 
misused.375 To the court, the only speculation to consider was 
whether the plaintiffs’ information had been stolen.376 The court 
found that waiting for the injury to occur would run counter to 
the proposition that future harm need not be “literally certain.”377  
Interestingly, the Remijas court used Adobe’s “real and 
immediate harm”—which came from Krottner—to satisfy the 
“substantial risk” standard acknowledged in Clapper. The court 
found that the “deliberate targeting” evidenced an “immediate 
and very real” threat that was not “highly attenuated” and 
“highly speculative.”378 The court correctly interpreted Clapper 
only to foreclose high levels of speculation. 
The Pisciotta, Adobe, and Remijas interpretations all have 
one element in common; they find standing where a network was 
deliberately targeted.379 They also tend to show that, at 
minimum, a targeted breach satisfies the “substantial risk” 
standard.380 While Pisciotta’s reasoning would not likely survive 
today, its similarity to more recent cases shows that the 
plaintiff’s claim would survive under a substantial risk of 
harm.381 Krottner’s reasoning, on the other hand, applies to the 
context where stolen data is readily available regardless of the 
thief’s intent to steal PII.382 Even without a clear and deliberate 
targeting of PII, immediate access to data presents a “real and 
                                                                                                     
standing to sue—the breach created a “substantial risk” of future identity theft). 
 375.  See Adobe, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1215. 
 376.  See id. (comparing the present case to Clapper where there was no 
evidence that the communications had been, or would be, monitored under the 
specific statute). 
 377.  See id. (requiring the plaintiffs to wait for an injury to occur would 
essentially render any imminent injury standard superfluous (citing Clapper v. 
Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 n.5 (2013))). 
 378.  Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 
2015). 
 379.  See cases cited supra note 335 (comparing deliberate and accidental 
theft cases). 
 380.  See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693 (conferring standing where plausibly pled 
a substantial risk of future harm). 
 381.  See In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1215 (N.D. 
Cal. 2014) (conferring standing on similar facts).  
 382.  See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(applying a slightly reworded version of the certainly impending standard—the 
standard that many post-Clapper use to deny standing in identical situations). 
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immediate” threat of future harm.383 Readily accessible PII leaves 
thieves in the same position as hackers after an intentional 
attack; in both scenarios, the only “speculation” left is for the 
injury to occur.384 In light of a properly limited Clapper, that 
neither overruled the substantial risk standard nor raised the 
certainly impending standard, data breach plaintiffs have an 
imminent harm sufficient to confer standing. 
VI. Conclusion 
Remijas, as the first circuit to consider imminent injury in 
data breach after Clapper, legitimately reopens the door for 
victims. Clapper shows no signs of heightening the certainly 
impending requirement. It absolutely does not call for toppling 
imminent injury claims when the only “speculative” act is the 
harm itself. Furthermore, Clapper was neither a data breach case 
nor did it consider the circuit precedent for standing in data 
breach case law. It merely applied the certainly impending 
standard and found that it was not satisfied. This outcome was 
proper given the highly attenuated and highly speculative chain 
of events.  
Clapper stands to maintain the traditional certainly 
impending standing requirement at its proper level—a highly 
speculative chain of events effectively defeating a claim of 
imminent injury. Likewise, it reaffirmed the legitimate judicial 
wariness involved when a theory of future harm speculates into 
the actions of independent governmental actors. The Court’s 
heightened scrutiny exemplified this caution, noting its 
reluctance to pass judgment on speculative future actions of the 
two other government branches. 
In this light, Remijas took Clapper for exactly what it was. It 
was not a bar to imminent injury claims flowing from data 
breaches. In fact, it does not apply at all. Injury is imminent 
when a thief has access to PII, whether acquiring it was 
intentional or not. A victim should not have to wait until the 
injury occurs. Given the minimal speculation involved, the 
                                                                                                     
 383. See Adobe, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1215 (finding Krottner’s “real and 
immediate” very similar to “certainly impending”). 
 384.  Id. 
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presence of a ready market for PII, and the ease of credit card 
fraud, there is a substantial risk for future harm (if the harm is 
not certainly impending). Clapper neither forecloses this 
conclusion nor should it be interpreted to do so. 
 
